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Resumen de la Tesis 
Título: Meritocracia y política interna en las organizaciones públicas: el caso 
de la Academia Húngara de las Ciencias 
Introducción al resumen 
EN las últimas décadas, el estudio de las empresas privadas ha recibido una atención 
creciente, aumentando así nuestra comprensión del comportamiento de los 
empleados y directivos en este tipo de organizaciones. El éxito de esta línea de 
investigación se ve reflejado en los premios Nobel otorgados a personalidades como 
Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson y Jean Tirole, y en la importancia adquirida por 
áreas como la Teoría de la Organización (Cyert y March 1963), la Economía de los 
Costes de Transacción (Williamson 1985), la Estrategia Organizacional (Nickerson 
y Silverman 2009) y la Economía Organizacional (Gibbons y Roberts 2013). 
Al mismo tiempo y pese al tamaño del sector público en las economías 
modernas, se ha dedicado mucha menos atención a las organizaciones públicas y a 
las características peculiares que las distinguen de las privadas. Una gran parte de la 
investigación sobre las empresas públicas se ha centrado en las ventajas de las 
privatizaciones y sus efectos sobre el rendimiento (Hart et al. 1997; Shleifer 1998; 
Cuervo y Villalonga 2000; Megginson y Netter 2001; Cuervo 2003, 2004; Levin y 
Tadelis 2010). Recientemente se ha abierto una prometedora línea de investigación 
en Ciencia Política y Economía que, partiendo del trabajo pionero de Weber (1921), 
ha investigado el funcionamiento de las agencias públicas y el comportamiento de 
los burócratas. Sin embargo, Moe (2013) ha observado cómo dicha literatura ha 
sido principalmente teórica, siendo necesario ampliar el número de análisis 
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empíricos que nos permitan entender cómo los empleados y directivos públicos 
responden a reglas organizativas e incentivos.  
Síntesis de los objetivos y resultados 
Mi tesis doctoral contribuye a cubrir el vacío de investigación empírica acerca de 
las organizaciones públicas, ofreciendo una evidencia detallada sobre cómo la 
Academia Húngara de las Ciencias selecciona sus nuevos miembros. 
Una importante razón para abordar este estudio de caso internacional es que, a 
diferencia de la gran mayoría de las organizaciones públicas, la Academia Húngara 
publica los datos sobre las elecciones de sus miembros, haciendo así posible que las 
variables determinantes de dichas elecciones puedan ser investigadas 
empíricamente.  
En un sentido más amplio, el estudio de las políticas de reclutamiento de una 
organización pública de ámbito científico como la Academia Húngara de las 
Ciencias es relevante por varios motivos. Por un lado, para analizar el papel clave 
de las prácticas de reclutamiento en el funcionamiento de las organizaciones 
públicas y, por otro, debido a la importancia de la investigación científica en el 
crecimiento económico de las economías modernas. La importancia del 
reclutamiento en las organizaciones públicas se debe a que sus empleados suelen 
tener autoridad decisional aun estando sujetos a incentivos débiles y un control 
laxo, lo que convierte la selección de empleados competentes e intrínsecamente 
motivados en un reto clave (Weber 1921; Williamson 1999). En cuanto a la 
investigación científica, se ha demostrado como ésta afecta positivamente al 
crecimiento económico de las economías avanzadas (ej., Stephan 1996; Mora-
Valentin et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2006; Montoro-Sánchez et al. 2006) y se le ha 
asignado un papel central en planes europeos de desarrollo como la Agenda de 
Lisboa y el plan Europa 2020. Por último, el estudio desarrollado en mi tesis es 
potencialmente relevante también desde el punto de vista de las políticas públicas. 
La Academia Húngara es la principal agencia de coordinación del país en el ámbito 
científico-académico, por tanto la comprensión de las fuerzas y debilidades de su 
sistema de reclutamiento podría inspirar reformas en agencias similares en España 
(CSIC, ANECA) y en el resto de la Unión Europea. 
El análisis empírico de las políticas de reclutamiento en la Academia Húngara 
de las Ciencias surgen indica la presencia de dos pautas principales. Por un lado, la 
calidad científica objetiva de los candidatos, medida por sus citas, afecta solo 
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marginalmente su probabilidad de ser elegidos como miembros de la Academia. Por 
el otro lado, la existencia de relaciones profesionales de los candidatos con los 
miembros de la Academia que deben evaluarlos aumenta considerablemente su 
probabilidad de ser elegidos.  
Conclusiones 
Los resultados de mi tesis doctoral, resumidos arriba, son relevantes en sí mismos y 
capaces también de estimular nuevas investigaciones en el futuro. Por un lado, 
dichos resultados confirman estudios anteriores según los cuales las decisiones de 
reclutamiento en las organizaciones académicas son influenciadas por el 
oportunismo de los reclutadores, especialmente cuando aquellos gozan de 
autonomía decisional (ej., Combes et al. 2008; Zinovyeva y Bagues 2015). Esto 
sugiere que en países en los que el Estado coordina activamente la actividad 
científica debería estudiarse cuidadosamente el problema del oportunismo de los 
reclutadores y explorarse posibles reformas en el gobierno de las agencias públicas 
de coordinación con el fin de corregir ese problema. 
Por otro lado, los resultados del presente estudio sugieren que las variables 
normalmente utilizadas para medir la calidad científica—es decir, las citas y los 
demás índices bibliométricos—tienen un peso casi nulo en las decisiones de 
reclutamiento de la Academia Húngara de las Ciencias. Dicho resultado podría 
deberse o bien al oportunismo de los reclutadores, o bien a que siendo la Academia 
una organización que solamente recluta entre los estudiosos más destacados, 
diferencias en la cuantía de citas no reflejan diferencias reales en la calidad 
científica. Dado que medir la calidad científica es importante para asignar de 
manera eficaz los fondos de investigación, acreditar el personal investigador y 
diseñar sistemas de incentivos en las organizaciones científicas, un análisis 
adicional que complemente el puzzle empírico que los resultados de esta tesis ponen 
de relieve constituye un reto importante que podría perseguirse en el futuro, tanto 
incrementando la base de datos sobre la Academia Húngara como investigando 
organizaciones similares en otros países. 
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Summary of the Thesis 
Title: Merit and Internal Politics in Public Organizations: The Case of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Introduction to the summary 
IN the last decades, the scientific study of private organizations has received 
increasing attention and has expanded our understanding of how firms’ employees 
and managers respond to rules and incentives. The success of this line of research is 
testified by the Nobel Prizes awarded to Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Jean 
Tirole, and by the growing importance of fields like Organization Theory (Cyert 
and March 1963), Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985), Organizational 
Strategy (Nickerson and Silverman 2009), and Organizational Economics (Gibbons 
and Roberts 2013). 
At the same time, and despite the size of the public sector in modern 
economies, less attention has been devoted to public organizations and to the 
peculiar features that may distinguish them from private ones. Most of the research 
on public firms has focused on the benefits of privatization and on their effect on 
performance (Hart et al. 1997; Shleifer 1998; Cuervo and Villalonga 2000; 
Megginson and Netter 2001; Cuervo 2003, 2004; Levin and Tadelis 2010). More 
recently, and building on the pioneering work of Weber (1921), a literature has 
developed in public policy and, to a smaller degree, in economics, which 
investigates the internal functioning of public agencies and the behavior of 
bureaucrats. However, Moe (2013) notes that this literature is primarily theoretical. 
This urgently calls for empirical analysis to help us understand how public agencies 
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differ from private ones, how their employees and officers respond to rules and 
incentives, and how changes in the latter modify their behavior and performance. 
Synthesis of the objective and results 
This dissertation contributes to overcome the scarcity of empirical research on 
public agencies by providing detailed evidence on how the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences recruits and renews its membership.  
An important reason for adopting this international-case-study approach is 
that, unlike most public organizations, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences makes 
data on the election of its new members publicly available, thus enabling the 
empirical analysis of the elections’ determinants.  
Even more crucially, however, studying recruitment in a scientific public 
organization may inform future research and policy because of the central role of 
recruitment in the functioning of public agencies, and the key contribution of 
scientific research to growth in modern economies. Regarding recruitment, it is key 
in public agencies because their employees enjoy substantial decision discretion and 
are subject to weak incentives and loose control, which makes the selection of 
competent and intrinsically motivated candidates paramount (Weber 1921; 
Williamson 1999). Regarding scientific research, it has been shown to significantly 
affect economic growth in the globalized and digital economies (e.g., Stephan 1996; 
Mora-Valentin et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2006; Montoro-Sánchez et al. 2006)—a 
point that is also reflected in the centrality of research in the European Union’s 
“Lisbon Agenda” and “Europe 2020” development plans. Finally, the study 
conducted here has potential policy relevance because the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences is the main public agency coordinating research in Hungary. Thus, 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of its recruitment practices may offer 
important lessons to “cousin” public agencies in Spain (CSIC and ANECA) and in 
the rest of Europe. 
Two major patterns emerge from the empirical analysis of recruitment 
policies at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. First, candidates’ objective quality, 
as measured by their citations, has a marginal effect on their chances to be elected 
as Academy members. Second, the existence of professional relationships between 
candidates and the Academy members in charge of evaluating them considerably 
enhances the former’s chances to be elected.  
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Conclusions 
The results of this dissertation, which are summarized below and presented in the 
subsequent chapters, seem both informative and capable of stimulating future 
research. On one hand, they confirm previous findings that when recruiters in 
academic public agencies enjoy discretion and autonomy, their decisions are 
partially affected by opportunism and the pursuit of private interests (e.g., Combes 
et al. 2008; Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015). This suggests that policymakers in 
countries where the State plays an important role in coordinating research should 
pay close attention to recruiters’ opportunism, and they should explore governance 
reforms that may correct or at least mitigate it. 
On the other hand, the results presented here suggest that widely accepted 
measures of how new members can contribute to a scientific organization—namely, 
citations and other bibliometric indexes—carry a small, if any at all, weight in 
recruiters’ decisions. The latter result may be due to the opportunism of recruiters, 
but also to the fact that in an organization that recruits among top-tier scholars, 
differences in citations may not reflect real differences in scientific quality. Given 
the importance of measuring scientific quality for the efficient assignment of 
research grants, the accreditation of scholars, and the creation of incentive and 
reward systems and governance rules in scientific organizations, elucidating this 
empirical puzzle seems important, and constitutes an exciting topic for future 
research that may be pursued by augmenting the database used in this dissertation, 
or by collecting similar data on related organizations in different countries. 
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IN the last decades, the scientific study of private organizations has received 
increasing attention and has expanded our understanding of how firms’ employees 
and managers respond to rules and incentives. The success of this line of research is 
testified by the Nobel Prizes awarded to Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Jean 
Tirole, and by the growing importance of fields like Organization Theory (Cyert 
and March 1963), Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985), Organizational 
Strategy (Nickerson and Silverman 2009), and Organizational Economics (Gibbons 
and Roberts 2013). 
At the same time, and despite the size of the public sector in modern 
economies, less attention has been devoted to public organizations and to the 
peculiar features that may distinguish them from private ones. Most of the research 
on public firms has focused on the benefits of privatization and on their effect on 
performance (Hart et al. 1997; Shleifer 1998; Cuervo and Villalonga 2000; 
Megginson and Netter 2001; Cuervo 2003, 2004; Levin and Tadelis 2010). More 
recently, and building on the pioneering work of Weber (1921), a literature has 
developed in public policy and, to a smaller degree, in economics, which 
investigates the internal functioning of public agencies and the behavior of 
bureaucrats. However, Moe (2013) notes that this literature is primarily theoretical. 
This urgently calls for empirical analysis to help us understand how public agencies 
differ from private ones, how their employees and officers respond to rules and 
incentives, and how changes in the latter modify their behavior and performance. 
This dissertation contributes to overcome the scarcity of empirical research on 
public agencies by providing detailed evidence on how the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences recruits and renews its membership.  
An important reason for adopting this international-case-study approach is 
that, unlike most public organizations, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences makes 
data on the election of its new members publicly available, thus enabling the 
empirical analysis of the elections’ determinants.  
Even more crucially, however, studying recruitment in a scientific public 
organization may inform future research and policy because of the central role of 
recruitment in the functioning of public agencies, and the key contribution of 
scientific research to growth in modern economies. Regarding recruitment, it is key 
in public agencies because their employees enjoy substantial decision discretion and 
are subject to weak incentives and loose control, which makes the selection of 
competent and intrinsically motivated candidates paramount (Weber 1921; 
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Williamson 1999). Regarding scientific research, it has been shown to significantly 
affect economic growth in the globalized and digital economies (e.g., Stephan 1996; 
Mora-Valentin et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2006; Montoro-Sánchez et al. 2006)—a 
point that is also reflected in the centrality of research in the European Union’s 
Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 development plans. Finally, the study conducted 
here has potential policy relevance because the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is 
the main public agency coordinating research in Hungary. Thus, understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of its recruitment practices may offer important lessons to 
cousin public agencies in Spain (CSIC and ANECA) and in the rest of Europe. 
Two major patterns emerge from the empirical analysis of recruitment 
policies at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. First, candidates’ objective quality, 
as measured by their citations, has a marginal effect on their chances to be elected 
as Academy members. Second, the existence of professional relationships between 
candidates and the Academy members in charge of evaluating them considerably 
enhances the former’s chances to be elected. 
The results of this dissertation, which are presented in the subsequent 
chapters, seem both informative and capable of stimulating future research. On one 
hand, they confirm previous findings that when recruiters in academic public 
agencies enjoy discretion and autonomy, their decisions are partially affected by 
opportunism and the pursuit of private interests (e.g., Combes et al. 2008; 
Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015). This suggests that policymakers in countries where 
the State plays an important role in coordinating research should pay close attention 
to recruiters’ opportunism, and they should explore governance reforms that may 
correct or at least mitigate it. 
On the other hand, the results presented here suggest that widely accepted 
measures of how new members can contribute to a scientific organization—namely, 
citations and other bibliometric indexes—carry a small, if any at all, weight in 
recruiters’ decisions. The latter result may be due to the opportunism of recruiters, 
but also to the fact that in an organization that recruits among top-tier scholars, 
differences in citations may not reflect real differences in scientific quality. Given 
the importance of measuring scientific quality for the efficient assignment of 
research grants, the accreditation of scholars, and the creation of incentive and 
reward systems and governance rules in scientific organizations, elucidating this 
empirical puzzle seems important, and constitutes an exciting topic for future 
research that may be pursued by augmenting the database used in this dissertation, 
or by collecting similar data on related organizations in different countries. 
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The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 presents the 
theme of this dissertation within its broader context, and it reviews the main related 
literatures. Chapter 2 describes the history, structure and functions of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Chapter 3 develops a simple analytical model of recruitment 
in public agencies, which generates testable predictions to guide the empirical 
analysis. Chapter 4 describes the database on the Academy’s elections, the 
empirical methodology used to analyze it, and the results. Finally, Chapter 5 
investigates idiosincrasies in the Academy’s recruitment policies across research 
fields by conducting separate empirical analyses for each of its scientific divisions. 
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1.1. Theoretical background: the tradeoff between expertise and 
authority in public organizations 
Nearly a century ago, Max Weber initiated the scientific study of public 
administration. In his seminal 1921 essay, Bureaucracy, he argued that a distinctive 
feature of modern states, as opposed to feudal ones, is that public bureaus are run by 
independent and specialized experts, rather than by rulers’ loyalists.  
Weber subsequently outlined the tenets around which an efficient, 
competence-based bureaucracy should be organized. Among those, he assigned a 
key role to three principles. First, bureaucrats should be selected meritocratically 
from a pool of professionals. Second, a combination of ex ante formal rules and ex 
post control by hierarchical superiors should govern their actions. Third, 
bureaucrats should be motivated by a sense of duty and loyalty to their office, rather 
than by the pursuit of personal enrichment or compensation, and they should be 
granted high social status and a secure career in the administration. 
More recent analyses of public bureaucracies grounded in transaction cost 
economics and agency theory, such as McCubbins et al. (1987) and Williamson 
(1999), basically concur with Weber in that the adherence to formal rules, combined 
with a civil servant, tenure-based employment model, may be optimal governance 
principals for public bureaucracies. In their analyses, the primary goal of both 
formal rules and the civil servant employment model seems to be that of preventing 
bureaucrats from shirking, or pursuing personal goals, instead of the public 
interest—that is, from engaging in the type of behavior that modern agency theory 
calls moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979), and transaction cost analysis calls 
opportunism (Williamson 1985). In particular, formal rules may limit the ability of 
bureaucrats to direct their attention to the wrong tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991, 1994), while holding a prestigious, and tenured, public office may discourage 
them from opportunistic behavior by creating intrinsic motivation (Benabou and 
Tirole 2006), reputational concerns (Ostrom 1990; MacLeod 2007), and efficiency 
wage effects—that is, the fear of losing a highly fulfilling job if caught shirking 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).1 In the public sector, these indirect motivational tools 
                                                 
1 In efficiency wage models, agents are concerned with losing the salary attached to their position. In 
public bureaucracies, civil servants cannot normally be dismissed, but they may be suspended from 
their functions, so the efficiency wage effect would depend on the loss of a fulfilling professional 
function, rather than on the loss of a wage.  
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may be preferable to explicit, output-based incentives because, as argued by Moe 
(1990, 2013), Tirole (1994), and others, public agencies, unlike private firms, often 
produce goods and services that are not traded in competitive markets, so 
disciplining and motivating bureaucrats through output-based incentives may be 
difficult. 
Building on these insights, decades of research and practice have generated 
the so called merit system model—a cornerstone of modern Public 
Administration—which essentially reaffirms Weber’s principle of a rule-based, 
meritocratic bureaucracy employing civil servants. For instance—and restricting 
attention to the recruitment of new employees, which is the main focus of this 
study—the Spanish Constitution prescribes that public employees be selected based 
on criteria of merit and impartiality (art. 103), and the Spanish Law regulating the 
status of public employees (Ley 7/2007, de 12 de abril) mandates that civil servants 
be tenured employees (art. 14 (a)) who pursue the public interest and act according 
to principles of integrity and austerity (artt. 52-53), that they must be selected based 
on objective merits by professional recruiters endowed with independence and 
discretion (art. 55), and that they be suspended from their functions (art. 96) upon 
serious violations of their duties as formally listed by law (art. 94). Similarly, the 
Merit System Principles followed by the US Federal Government, and recorded in 
the US Code, state that:  
Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in an 
endeavor […] and selection and advancement should be determined solely on the 
basis of relative ability, knowledge and skills, after fair and open competition which 
assures that all receive equal opportunity.  
(5 USC § 2301)  
The Merit System Principles also include a set of rules aimed at preventing 
opportunistic or corrupt recruitment practices, such as bans on discrimination and 
the acceptance of recommendations not based on candidates’ merits.2 
Building a competence-based bureaucracy governed by verifiable rules and 
intrinsic motivation, as recommended by the merit system model, seems an 
attractive goal for modern states, whose functions are increasingly complex and 
multi-faceted. But is it also a feasible goal? Is it possible to simultaneously limit the 
                                                 
2 The US Federal government also maintains a Merit System Protection Board, which oversees 
compliance with the Merit System Principles. See the Board’s website, www.mspb.gov, for more 
details.  
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discretion of bureaucrats via rules and control mechanisms—thus insulating them 
from politics, corruption, and opportunism—while inducing them to collect the 
relevant information, and to make appropriate use of it in performing their tasks? In 
other words, is bureaucratic expertise compatible with authority and control? 
A significant body of research in public administration, organizational theory, 
and political science, suggests that reconciling expertise and control may indeed be 
difficult. At the roots of such difficulty lies the fundamental informational problem 
highlighted by Hayek (1945), and further elaborated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1992), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and others. While formal rules are centrally 
designed, monitored, and enforced by legislators, political leaders, and courts, the 
information necessary to perform productive tasks, and to adapt them to changing 
circumstances, is locally dispersed, and it can only be collected, and often even 
interpreted, by specialized agents. Hence, dictating non-opportunistic behavior to 
bureaucrats via ex ante rules without forcing them to sacrifice relevant information 
or make inefficient decisions under some contingencies, seems an impossible task 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1994)—pretty much like it has been proved to be 
impossible to design complete contracts that force the members of an organization 
to take the appropriate actions in all possible circumstances (e.g., Williamson 1979; 
Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1988). In other words, if ex ante rules are 
to govern the behavior of bureaucrats, those rules will necessarily be rigid, and 
hence inefficient. Moreover, and related, as emphasized by the literature on 
delegation, control and interference by hierarchical superiors may reduce the 
motivation of bureaucrats to take the initiative and be proactive in using their 
specialized knowledge to solve unforeseen problems (Aghion and Tirole 1997; 
Baker et al. 1999).  
As a result of the informational problems discussed above, and given the 
weakness of market-based incentives in the provision of many public services, a 
tradeoff seems to arise between bureaucratic expertise, which is enhanced by 
delegating responsibilities and discretion to bureaucrats, and opportunism, which is 
minimized by reducing the bureaucrats’ discretion and by forcing them to follow 
rigid rules. In fact, as emphasized by Simon (1946) and Simon et al. (1950), the 
balance observed in practice seems to often favor delegation and discretion at the 
expense of control:  
It does not go too far to say that unity of command […] never has existed in any 
administrative organization.  
(Simon 1946, p. 56)  
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As a result, public bureaucracies are usually perceived as having—sometimes 
optimally so, at least in a second best sense—considerable autonomy and power 
(Niskanen 1971; Hammond and Miller 1985; Wilson 1989; Bawn 1995; Epstein 
and O’Halloran 1994). Indeed, Weber himself, and some prominent Weberian 
sociologists after him (e.g., Parsons 1947), recognized the tradeoff, and argued that 
in a complex society, the theoretical model of rule-based, rationally designed 
bureaucracy may well drift towards a de facto dictatorship of bureaucrats. 
1.2. Research question: the behavior of public agencies’ recruiters 
under a delegated governance structure 
1.2.1. Recruitment in public agencies 
This thesis is primarily concerned with a specific dimension of the operation 
of public agencies—namely, the recruitment of their employees and officers. 
Recruitment is particularly important because, as emphasized by Weber (1921), an 
expertise-based bureaucracy requires that its personnel be selected based on merit, 
rather than on political or personal loyalty. But if recruiters are biased or motivated 
by private interests other than the agency’s mission, there is no guarantee that they 
will select experts. Hence, if an efficient, Weberian public bureaucracy is to exist, 
its recruiters must be themselves properly motivated and governed. Unfortunately, 
the governance of a public recruitment system suffers from the same tradeoff 
between expertise and authority that plagues all functions of public bureaucracies. 
Recruiters are, perhaps more than any other bureaucrat, specialized experts, so any 
attempt to centrally guide them or control them in their choices will tend to make 
those choices less efficient. On the other hand, excessively loose rules and control 
may tempt the recruiters to make nepotistic, or otherwise opportunistic selection 
choices, unless they are intrinsically motivated and driven.  
In practice, recruitment systems in public bureaucracies attempt to balance the 
two elements of this tradeoff. On the expertise side, selection is usually delegated to 
specialized committees—either internal to the agency or constituting permanent or 
ad hoc agencies of their own—rather than being remotely micro-managed by 
legislators via rules. This is especially the case if the bureaucrats to be recruited 
must possess specialized and technical knowledge that can only be assessed by their 
peers, as in academic and scientific organizations, the judiciary, or the diplomatic 
corps. Recruiters in these types of public agencies are typically themselves civil 
servants, so they have little explicit incentives to align their recruitment choices 
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with the agency’s mission. For instance, in most European countries, judges and 
public university professors are chosen by their peers, while civil servants in 
regulatory agencies are chosen by committees that may include sitting officers of 
the agency as well as members proceeding from other branches of the public 
administration.  
On the authority side of the tradeoff, the discretion of public recruiters is to 
some extent constrained by rules that may require them to give specific weights to 
certain objective characteristics of candidates—such as their education titles, or in 
academic recruitment, the quantity and citation impact of their publications—as 
well as to treat similar candidates equally, and to produce written, and hence 
verifiable, reports describing and justifying the criteria they have followed in the 
process. Overall, however, it seems fair to argue that recruiters in public agencies 
enjoy considerable discretion, and the more so the more the agency rests on 
specialized, technical knowledge.  
1.2.2. Empirical questions 
Despite the abundance of theoretical analyses, there is remarkably little 
evidence on how recruiters in public agencies actually behave. This question could 
be addressed empirically in two ways. On one hand, one may investigate what 
drives the recruiters’ choices, given the public agency’s organizational rules and 
incentive system. On the other hand, one could study how changes in the agency’s 
organizational rules and incentives affect the behavior of otherwise similar 
recruiters.  
This thesis adopts the first approach. Specifically, I focus on a setting—which 
as discussed above, is fairly representative—where the public agency’s recruitment 
system is characterized by delegation of selection tasks to specialized experts, 
limited ex ante and ex post control via rules and monitoring, and the granting of a 
civil servant status to recruiters, who have therefore weak explicit incentives to 
align their selection choices to the agency’s mission. Given this governance 
structure, I ask the following question: do the public agency’s recruiters select new 
members who are likely to reciprocate them by providing favors and private 
benefits, or do they choose members who have the best qualifications to accomplish 
the agency’s mission?  
This question is important for both research and policy, as any reform of 
governance in public bureaucracies that aims to improve the selection and retention 
of employees should be based on a sound assessment of how recruiters behave 
under a given governance structure. Yet, the answer to this question is far from 
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obvious. While the modern rational choice theory of public bureaucracy, as 
pioneered by Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967), and developed by many of the 
authors cited in this chapter, assumes the bureaucrat behaves like a homo 
oeconomicus—that is, as a selfish maximizer of his own utility—behavioral 
economists, psychologists and sociologists alike, have emphasized and documented 
the existence of intrinsic motivation, which may induce individuals in an 
organization to pursue the organization’s goal even in the absence of explicit 
incentives and control mechanisms (e.g., Benabou and Tirole 2006). Relatedly, as 
mentioned before, social norms and concerns for one’s reputation and good 
standing within the community of reference (e.g., Ostrom 1990; MacLeod 2007), as 
well as the fear to lose a secure career and salary in case of clear misconduct 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Williamson 1999), may also suffice to deter 
opportunism even in the absence of tight rules, monitoring, and control systems. 
If recruiters in public agencies are willing to serve the public interest or the 
goals assigned to them by people’s representatives in the legislature and 
government, due to intrinsic motivation or reputational concerns, we may achieve 
an efficient and meritocratic selection without sacrificing information and quality—
that is, without constraining the autonomy of recruiters through rules, authority, and 
incentives based on explicit performance goals. On the other hand, if recruiters in 
public bureaucracies are opportunistic, or if reputational concerns are too weak to 
significantly affect their behavior, the aforementioned tradeoff between recruitment 
effectiveness (fostered by the delegation of authority) and opportunism (also 
enhanced by delegation) arises, and any attempts at policy reform will need to 
address it. 
1.2.3. Empirical methodology 
While the theoretical scope of the research questions outlined above is broad, 
the empirical strategy adopted here is deliberately specific. Instead of studying the 
behavior of recruiters across similarly organized public agencies—a task that would 
force me to resort to anecdotal analysis, due to the impossibility of collecting 
detailed information on such a scale—I analyze in depth the recruitment processes 
and the behavior of recruiters in one public organization for which I had access to 
comprehensive data—namely, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (hereafter, the 
HAS). 
An important reason to focus on the HAS is data availability. As we will see 
in the next chapters, testing empirically for the behavior of recruiters in public 
agencies requires detailed information on candidates to agency positions, on 
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recruiters, on the recruiters’ selection choices and on the criteria that drive them. 
Most of these data are normally proprietary, and they are regarded by public 
agencies as confidential. In contrast, the HAS makes personal information on its 
members (who also serve as recruiters), on candidates to membership (nominees), 
and on the outcome of the selection process (which nominees are elected as 
members), available to the public. This information, combined with public data on 
the scholarly quality of candidates and recruiters and on their scientific and 
workplace relationships, allows me to conduct a systematic empirical study of the 
HAS’s recruitment practices and to assess, at least in part, its consistency with the 
received theoretical explanations. 
Besides data availability, the HAS is also a relevant setting for empirical 
analysis because of its multi-faceted and important tasks as a public scientific 
organization, as well as its original organizational structure. I will elaborate more on 
these points in Chapter 2 of this thesis, which describes and discusses the HAS, and 
its historical and current functions and features. 
1.3. Preview of the results and their implications 
To address my research question using the HAS data, I proceed in two steps. First, 
in Chapter 3, I develop a simple formal model that captures the most salient features 
of recruitment at the HAS (and in many other public bureaucracies)—namely, 
recruiters’ discretion and the absence of explicit incentives. In the model, a 
representative recruiter decides whether to select a candidate or not by maximizing 
his own utility, which is a function of the candidate’s observed characteristics. In 
particular, the model allows for both opportunism and intrinsic 
motivation/reputation/social norms to affect the recruiter’s choices, by allowing the 
recruiter’s utility to depend, on one hand, on observable signals of the candidate’s 
quality (publications, past performance as a coauthor or colleague), and on the other 
hand, on the candidate’s ability, if elected, to compensate the recruiter at the 
expense of public agency via private favors. While the model abstracts from many 
other real features of public bureaucracies and of the HAS (for instance, by 
assuming only one recruiter and one candidate), it clarifies in a simple way the 
mechanisms through which a rational recruiter may articulate his choices, and thus 
it allows me to derive precise testable predictions that will guide the subsequent 
empirical analysis. 
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The model predicts that a recruiter characterized by (some degree of) both 
motivation and opportunism will tend to select candidates whose quality is higher 
and easier to measure but, also, who are more capable of privately favor him. 
Moreover, the model predicts that a recruiter who is mainly driven by opportunism 
should place greater weight in his evaluation on the candidates’ ability to privately 
favor him, whereas a recruiter whose interests are primarily aligned with those of 
the public agency should place greater weight on the candidates’ observed quality.  
As a second step in my analysis, in Chapters 4 and 5, I test the model’s 
predictions using a comprehensive dataset of elections of new HAS members 
between 2004 and 2013. Thanks to the HAS public database (which is described in 
detail in Chapter 4), I can observe the identity of candidates, recruiters—who are 
members of the HAS scientific division to which candidates are assigned—and 
nominators (candidates can only be elected if they are nominated by a minimum 
number of HAS members established by the HAS President before the election3), as 
well as the outcome of elections—that is, which candidates become members of the 
HAS and which ones do not. Moreover, by matching the information on candidates 
provided by the HAS with the Web of Science database on scholars’ bibliometric 
indicators and with biographic information on the candidates as reported in their 
CVs and other public sources, I construct measures of the candidates’ observable 
quality (cumulative citations to their articles) and of whether the candidates are 
personally connected with their recruiters (the number of candidates’ coauthors and 
colleagues who are members of the HAS relevant division, and hence are entitled to 
vote on the candidates’ election). Importantly, while being a candidate’s coauthor or 
colleague may increase both the recruiter’s information on the candidate’s quality 
and his ability to extract private benefit from him, the effect is clearly asymmetric: 
coauthorship improves quality assessment more than it enhances the potential for 
benefit extraction, and vice versa, a colleague relationship enhances the potential 
for benefit extraction more than it improves quality assessment. 
The empirical analysis reveals two important patterns. First, I find that after 
controlling for various candidate characteristics such as the number of times he has 
been up for election, the number of HAS members endorsing his nomination and his 
age, as well as year-specific and field-specific fixed effects, a candidate’s 
observable quality, as proxied by his citations, has a positive but very small impact 
                                                 
3 In the past three election cycles, the minimum number of endorsers has been set at three. 
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on the HAS members’ decision to elect him. Second, I find that, while being a 
colleague of his recruiters (either at the institution level or at the department level) 
has a positive and significant effect on a candidate’s chances to be elected, being 
their coauthor has a negligible, and if anything negative, effect. 
The above results are consistent with the rational choice model of public 
bureaucracies, according to which recruiters with decision discretion and low-
powered incentives will tend to select candidates who benefit them privately but do 
not necessarily benefit the organization. The results do not rule out the possibility 
that intrinsic motivation, reputational concerns and social norms may mitigate the 
opportunism of recruiters—first, because I cannot observe the strength of these 
implicit incentives and whether opportunism co-varies with it, and second, because 
there may be unobserved dimensions of candidates’ quality that are not captured by 
my bibliometric citation measures and yet affect their election chances. 
Nevertheless, my empirical results clearly do not support a theoretical model where 
implicit incentive mechanisms are strong enough to fully neutralize recruiters’ 
opportunism—a finding that should be taken into account in thinking about reforms 
of the HAS and of similarly organized public agencies. The results are also 
consistent with recent evidence on recruitment in different but related organizations, 
such as the Econometric Society (Hamermesh and Schmidt 2003), and public 
universities in France (Combes et al. 2008) and Spain (Zinovyeva and Bagues 
2015).  
1.4. Relation to the literature 
Because the study of public organizations is inherently interdisciplinary, it is not 
surprising that this thesis makes contact with several and heterogeneous literatures, 
spanning fields as diverse as sociology, organization theory, political science, and 
economics. I briefly review below these literatures, and their relation to this thesis, 
organizing my discussion by topic. 
1.4.1. Public bureaucracies  
As discussed earlier, the modern science of public administration and 
bureaucracy can be traced back to Weber (1921). The Weberian idea that a well-
organized bureaucracy should simultaneously rest on bureaucrats’ expertise and 
civil servant status on one hand, and on control by legislators and hierarchical 
superiors on the other, has been criticized by some of Weber’s students and 
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followers, such as Parsons (1947), Gouldner (1954), and Bendix (1971), on the 
grounds that the two principles appear to be often in conflict. More forcefully, 
Herbert Simon and his coauthors noted that not only there is a tradeoff between 
expertise and authority/control, but also that the tradeoff is often resolved in 
practice in favor of expertise and against authority—in other words, bureaucrats 
have de facto power over their hierarchical superiors due to their superior 
information on the content and context of bureaucratic tasks (Simon 1946; Simon et 
al. 1950; see Wilson 1989 for related empirical work). More recently, Hammond 
and Miller (1985) have used the tools of social choice theory, as developed by 
pioneering scholars such as Arrow (1950) and Sen (1970), to formally demonstrate 
the impossibility for a bureaucracy to simultaneously satisfy all the efficiency 
principles invoked in the earlier Weberian literature. 
The tradeoff between expertise and authority has been more thoroughly 
explored by political scientists using the tools of agency theory, transaction cost 
analysis and new institutional economics. In particular, Niskanen (1970), and after 
him Bendor et al. (1985) and Banks and Weingast (1992), formally analyzes the 
power of bureaucrats as stemming from their superior information on the costs and 
benefits of the services supplied by the bureau.  
On the other side of the tradeoff, Weingast and Moran (1983) and McCubbins 
and Schwartz (1984) emphasize the ability of political leaders to control bureaucrats 
through ex post control mechanisms, such as oversight, the budget, and the threat of 
new legislation. A set of complementary articles emphasize instead ex ante rules 
and procedures as means of control over the bureaucracy (McCubbins et al. 1987). 
More critically, Moe (1990) stresses how the procedures designed to structure and 
control the bureaucracy are often not guided by efficiency criteria, as they respond 
to the strategic, self-interested calculus of political leaders. Williamson (1999) 
emphasizes both ex ante procedures and ex post control, and within ex post control, 
he argues that implicit motivation mechanisms, such as the creation of reputational 
concerns linked to the civil servant status, and efficiency-wage-like contracts linked 
to tenure, are especially relevant in public bureaucracies.  
Finally, Bawn (1995) and, most importantly, Epstein and O’Halloran (1994, 
1999) study the optimal level of delegation of discretion to bureaucrats as resulting 
from the tradeoff between expertise and authority, showing that delegation should 
be greater the stronger the informational advantage of bureaucrats and the lower 
their interest conflict with political leaders and legislators. A more comprehensive 
and up-to-date review of the public policy literature on bureaucracies can be found 
in Moe (2013). 
 Governance and Performance in Public Organizations 
 
 
39 
1.4.2. Delegation of authority in organizations 
The tradeoff between expertise and authority, central to the literature on 
public bureaucracies reviewed above, has also been analyzed by economists within 
the frameworks of agency theory and incomplete contracting. While much of the 
analysis of delegation and authority in modern organizational economics focuses on 
private firms, many of its insights can be applied, and are often applied to 
understand governance and incentives in public agencies. 
The themes of delegation, discretion and autonomy are at the center of the 
classic agency literature (Holmstrom 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, 1994), 
where agents are assumed to be so autonomous—either due to their unique 
expertise or to the overwhelming costs of monitoring their performance—that the 
only way to reduce their moral hazard, and the consequent shirking and 
opportunistic behavior, is to link their compensation to some measure of their 
output (see Gibbons 1998, 2005a for comprehensive reviews of the agency 
literature on incentive contracts). As we saw, this solution seems less easily 
applicable in public bureaucracies, where reliable measures of the agents’ output are 
often missing due to the lack of competitive markets for the supplied services (Moe 
1990). 
In his seminal analysis of the nature of the firm, Coase (1937) argues that, 
unlike market transactions, transactions within firms (one could generalize and say 
within organizations) are not based on autonomy but rather, on authority—that is, 
on the power of bosses to dictate decisions to their subordinates, to ratify the 
decisions initiated by the latter, and to inflict sanctions in case of non-compliance. 
This perspective is shared by Simon’s (1951) authority-based analysis of the 
employment relationship, Williamson’s analysis of the differential organization of 
markets and hierarchies (Williamson 1975, 1985; see also Masten 1988), and by the 
taxonomy of firms’ decision-making rules proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Building on the insights of the above classic theories, recent formal models 
have attempted to analyze the costs and benefits of the delegation of authority in 
organizations more precisely. The starting point in these models is that once an 
agent is given authority, he may be able, and motivated, to use his expertise and 
information to develop decisions and policies according to his superiors’ desires, 
but he may also be tempted to recommend to his superiors decisions that are biased 
towards his own private objectives (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Crawford and Sobel 
1982). Building on these observations, Aghion and Tirole (1997), Baker et al. 
(1999), and Dessein (2002), argue that giving the authority to ratify the agent’s 
decisions to a boss (i.e., separating the initiation and ratification phases of decision-
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making)—via formal centralization of decision rights or access to information—
may produce less biased, but also less effective and innovative decisions.4 If applied 
to public bureaucracies, the conclusions from this literature are not dissimilar from 
those one can draw from the public policy literature—namely, that bureaucrats may 
have de facto decision power due to their superior information and to the costs of 
constraining it via hierarchical control, and may use that power opportunistically. 
An important observation on the literature on delegation and on the tradeoff 
between expertise and authority, both in economics and in public policy, is that 
most contributions to it are primarily theoretical. Besides case studies (e.g., Aguilar 
and Bahmbri 1986; Foss 2003) and a few cross-country empirical studies (e.g., 
Bloom et al. 2012), there is little empirical evidence on how agents and their bosses 
behave in a decentralized or centralized organization, be it a private firm or, as in 
this thesis, a public agency. In this sense, the empirical investigation conducted here 
provides a novel contribution to the literature. 
1.4.3. Personnel recruitment 
Because of its focus on recruitment decisions in public agencies, this thesis 
relates to the broader recruitment literature in personnel economics and human 
resource management. This literature has been primarily concerned with two 
problems that are not analyzed here—namely, the optimal matching between 
employees’ skills and firms’ needs (e.g., Jovanovic 1979), and the firm’s problem 
of assessing the employees’ skills in the presence of incomplete information (e.g., 
Spence 1973; Salop and Salop 1976; Lazear 1986). 
Since the theoretical literature on recruitment is only tangentially related to 
this thesis, I will not discuss it in detail here, referring instead interested readers to 
the recent survey of both theory and evidence by Lazear and Oyer (2013). One 
point, however, is worth emphasizing. None of the theoretical analyses of 
recruitment policies in the personnel literature discusses the problem of recruiters’ 
opportunism. This omission is perhaps best understood by noticing that while 
recruiters’ opportunism appears relevant in public bureaucracies, where recruiters 
have low-powered incentives, it seems less of a concern in private firms—the main 
object of analysis in the personnel literature—where recruiters’ incentives are 
                                                 
4 Another possible cost of centralizing ratification authority is that it may create an incentive for 
subordinates to engage in unproductive, rent-seeking lobbying activities aimed at influencing the 
boss’ decisions. See Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Gibbons (2005b) for models in this spirit. 
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generally more aligned with those of the firm, either because or direct ownership 
stakes or because of output-based incentives and career concerns.  
While the theoretical literature on recruitment has largely abstracted from the 
problem of recruiters’ opportunism, a few empirical studies have focused on one 
particular form of recruiter opportunism in private firms—namely race and sex 
discrimination. For instance, Neumark et al. (1996) study sex discrimination in 
restaurant hiring, Goldin and Rouse (2000) study sex discrimination in the 
recruitment of musicians at symphony orchestras, Petersen et al. (2000, 2005) study 
both sex and race discrimination in high-tech and services companies. All of these 
papers find some evidence that even in private firms and organizations, gender and 
race identity do affect the chances of job seekers. Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) 
analyze the retail banking industry, focusing on social ties more broadly, and they 
find a significant effect of referrals on candidates’ likelihood to be hired.  
More related to this thesis, there is a small but significant empirical literature 
that studies recruitment in the context of scientific and academic organizations. This 
literature, and the broader literature on the governance of scientific institutions, is 
discussed in the next, and final, paragraph of this literature review.  
1.4.4. Governance and recruitment in scientific organizations 
Given its focus on recruitment as the task delegated to bureaucrats, and on a 
scientific organization—the Hungarian Academy of Sciences—as the context of 
analysis, this paper relates to the economic literature on academic governance and, 
in particular, to the strand of this literature that investigates empirically the 
recruitment of academics and scientists in public institutions. 
Building on the insights of organization theory, as summarized above, a 
number of authors have analyzed the governance of academic institutions, 
particularly universities. Early theoretical work highlighting the motivational role of 
up-or-out, tenure-based promotion systems in academia are Carmichael (1983), 
Kahn and Huberman (1988), and Prendergast (1993). More recently, Masten (2006, 
2013) discusses the differential roles of democratic, voting-based decision-making 
procedures in universities as opposed to firms, and provides empirical evidence on 
the temporal evolution and cross-sectional patterns in the allocation of decision 
authority in universities. Lach and Shankerman (2004, 2008), and Belenzon and 
Shankerman (2009), analyze the effect of intellectual property rights and 
performance incentives on universities’ innovativeness. Aghion et al. (2010) 
investigate the effect of organizational practices on universities’ outputs, and find 
that output is generally increased by a combination of competitive research funding 
Doctoral Thesis by Zsuzsanna Szemerédi: Merit and Internal Politics in Public Organizations: The Case of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
 
 
42 
and autonomy from governmental control. Haeck and Verboven (2012) study the 
internal human resource management practices of a European public university, and 
find evidence of the existence of internal labor markets. Ytsma (2014) provides 
evidence that the introduction of pay-for-performance for academics in Germany 
increased assortative matching—that is, the tendency of high quality candidates to 
accrue to high quality departments. References to earlier works on academic 
governance can be found in these papers. 
More related to this thesis, a few empirical papers have studied the relative 
effect of candidates’ quality and their connection to recruiters on the selection 
choices in academic and scientific institutions. Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) 
examine the determinants of elections of Fellows of the Econometric Society. They 
notice that a fair system would select candidates based solely on their scientific 
quality, and they subsequently ask whether candidate characteristics other than 
quality matter in the Society’s elections. They find that indeed, quality measures 
such as citations and editorial activity in the Society’s journal, Econometrica, 
increase a candidate’s chances to be elected. However, they find that characteristics 
not directly related to quality, such as being affiliated to a North American 
university or being an economic theorist rather than an empiricist, also positively 
affect a candidate’s election chances. While informative, the empirical analysis in 
Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) is deliberately illustrative and descriptive, as they 
do not attempt to explain the organizational or political mechanisms underlying the 
observed patterns. 
Combes et al. (2008) study the determinants of success at the national 
examination for associate professor positions in French public universities.5 They 
ask to what extent measures of a candidate’s quality (namely, his publications) and 
measures of a candidate’s connections with members of the selection committee 
(mainly, having a coauthor, a PhD advisor, or a colleague in the committee) affect 
his/her chances of success at the exam. They find that while both observed quality 
and connections positively affect the chances of success, the effect of connections—
particularly, having a PhD advisor or colleague in the committee—is significantly 
stronger. The empirical results in Combes et al. (2008) are consistent with the basic 
theoretical idea that recruiters in a public selection committee, whose members have 
weak incentives to pursue the public goal of merit-based selection, may behave 
                                                 
5 Perotti (2002) conducts a related study for recruitment in Italian public universities. 
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opportunistically. However, one could also interpret their connection variables as 
indicators of the amount of soft information on the candidate that is available to 
committee members (as opposed to the hard, objective information represented by 
publications). For instance, committee members may be in a better position to 
evaluate the scientific quality of a coauthor. Relatedly, professor positions do not 
only involve research, but also teaching and administrative activities, and a 
candidate’s potential in those dimensions can be arguably better assessed by a 
colleague. These identification concerns have been addressed by Li (2012) and 
Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015), to whose discussion I now turn. 
Li (2012) studies the differential roles of connections (measured by cross-
citations between application reviewers and applicants) and applicant quality 
(measured by application-related publications) in the allocation of grant funds by 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health. Her strategy for disentangling the 
opportunism dimension of connections from their informational dimension is based 
on the theoretical proposition that holding the size of connections constant, the 
interaction of an applicant’s connections with his observed quality would measure 
the informational role of connections, whereas the level effect of connections would 
measure their opportunism role. Moreover, Li (2012) controls for the potential 
correlation between an applicant’s connections and unobserved dimensions of 
his/her quality by focusing on the effect of connections with full-time members of 
the review committee (see the paper for details on this), while holding the total 
number of connections constant. Relying on this empirical strategy, Li (2012) finds 
that reviewers exhibit both superior information and opportunistic bias towards 
connected applicants. 
Finally, Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) study the determinants of success at 
the Spanish national accreditation examination for associate and full professors. 
Similarly to Combes et al. (2008), they find that not only candidates’ objective 
quality, but also their connections with members of the selection committee, 
positively affect their chances of success. At the same time, Zinovyeva and Bagues 
(2015) make substantial progress over Combes et al. (2008) and earlier related 
works, under two key respects. First, the assignment of committee members to 
candidates is randomly determined in their dataset, which enables them to identify 
the causal effect of candidate characteristics on success. Second, they develop a 
credible strategy for disentangling the informational role and the opportunistic role 
of connections. In particular, they notice that if connections with candidates 
improve the committee’s soft information on their quality, successful candidates 
connected to the committee should have on average better quality, and hence they 
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should perform better after the exam compared to successful but non-connected 
candidates. The reverse should be true if connections with candidates primarily 
enhanced the ability of committees to opportunistically exchange favors with them. 
They test these competing hypotheses and find that, consistent with connections 
being related to opportunism, but not with soft information, the post-examination 
performance of successful candidates decreases when they were strongly connected 
to the committee that selected them. 
The empirical investigation conducted in this thesis contributes to the above 
literature in several ways. Like Combes et al. (2008) and Zinovyeva and Bagues 
(2015), I have access to comprehensive data on all candidates to a given position—
both those who are successful and those who are not. Two unique features of my 
database distinguish it from the aforementioned studies on recruitment in public 
universities. First, membership of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences does not 
involve ongoing professional and personal interactions between its scholars. 
Second, the tasks of members are quintessentially scientific—they must represent 
the nation at the highest scientific level, advise the government, coordinate research 
institutes, and participate to the accreditation of researchers (see Chapter 2 of this 
thesis for more details on the HAS’s functions and structure). Taken together, these 
features imply that, unlike in the case of universities, soft information on a 
candidate’s fit to the HAS can be more easily gathered by recruiters who know him 
as a coauthor than by recruiters who know him as a colleague, as coauthorship is a 
far more direct vehicle of scientific interaction whereas the type of information that 
could be more easily assessed by a colleague—for instance, on teaching or 
administration skills—does not seem relevant in the case of the HAS. As discussed 
before, and as further clarified in Chapter 4, this feature of my dataset allows me to 
devise a strategy to test for the presence of opportunism in recruiters’ choices. 
A disadvantage of my dataset, compared to that of Zinovyeva and Bagues 
(2015), is that the match of recruiters to candidates at the HAS is non-random, as all 
the sitting members of a scientific division of the HAS act as recruiters, and 
therefore their identity is known from the outset to both candidates and their 
endorsers. While the lack of random matching does not allow me to rule out that the 
estimated effects may be at least partially biased by endogeneity, the observable 
quality of candidates is not systematically correlated with their connections to HAS 
members in my database, suggesting that the empirical results are unlikely to be 
primarily driven by endogeneity. 
 Chapter 2. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences: History, Role, 
and Organization 
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2.1. A brief history of the HAS 
In this section, I briefly summarize the most salient aspects of the HAS’s history. 
More details on it can be found in Hargittai and Hargittai (2015), as well as on the 
dedicated page of the HAS’s website (http://mta.hu/articles/history-of-the-
hungarian-academy-of-sciences-129195).  
The HAS was created in 1825, as a non-governmental foundation, upon the 
initiative of a group of enlightened aristocrats led by count István Szécheny, who 
contributed financially to the enterprise with one year of his estates’ income. The 
original purpose of the HAS was to consolidate and propagate the Hungarian 
language, particularly as a vehicle to diffuse humanistic and scientific knowledge, 
at a time when the country’s official language was still Latin. Since its foundation, 
the HAS has counted the country’s intellectual elites among its members. Some 
early members, including Szécheny, the poets Arany and Vörösmarty, and jurist 
Déak, also had major political and governmental roles, and importantly contributed 
to the revival of the Hungarian national sentiment and to the country’s negotiation 
of an autonomous kingdom status within the Austrian Empire—a goal that was 
eventually achieved in 1867.  
In its early years, the HAS was supervised by the Monarch, who authorized its 
meetings and activities and appointed its officers and governing Board. In 1867, in 
parallel with Hungary’s increased autonomy from Austria, new bylaws were passed, 
which granted the HAS members the right to autonomously elect part of the Board. 
The following decades were characterized by an intense development and 
intellectual activity of the HAS and by the enrollment of prestigious international 
scholars, such as Santiago Ramón y Cajal, John Stuart Mill, and Charles Darwin, as 
honorary members.  
In the years between the two World Wars, the HAS was once again subjected 
to governmental control, and in accordance with the country’s authoritarian political 
regime and its alliance with the Axis powers, many non-aligned members and 
Jewish members were ostracized. In the brief democratic period following World 
War II, the HAS gained back, and even increased, its independence from 
governmental and political control, as the 1946 new bylaws gave its members, for 
the first time in the Academy’s history, the right to elect the entire governing Board. 
In the Communist period (1949-1990), governmental control of the HAS was 
once again restored, as the Communist Party saw the HAS as an important vehicle 
to create and propagate a research policy in line with the country’s new Marxist-
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Leninist ideology. Consistent with this strategic goal, and following the 
organizational model adopted in the Soviet Union, the Party considerably expanded 
the HAS’s tasks. In particular, the HAS was now in charge of directing a network of 
research institutes—a task it still maintains today—where most of the country’s 
scientific research was conducted.6 In addition, during Communism the HAS was in 
charge of organizing scholars’ postgraduate training, developing a centralized 
system of academic degrees, and crediting academic institutions. During the 
Communist years, humanities were des-emphasized relative to the natural and 
social sciences, and several HAS members nominated in the pre-communist years 
were ostracized. 
Following the end of Communism and the restoration of democracy in 
Hungary, new HAS bylaws were passed in 1994, and as a consequence of the end 
of the Communist Party’s control, the HAS acquired its current form of a scholarly 
public body founded on self-government. The current structure and tasks of the 
HAS are discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
2.2. Current tasks and organization of the HAS 
Currently, the HAS is an academic institution, whose broad mission is to foster 
scholarly excellence and scientific research in Hungary. As further discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter, the HAS is in charge of curating publications, 
awarding scholarly grants, advising the government on technical aspects of 
legislation, awarding a special academic degree called Doctor of the HAS—which 
greatly helps scholars being certified as eligible for full professorship in Hungary’s 
public university system and obtaining a full professor position in the country’s 
major public universities—and directing a capillary network of research centers and 
institutes across the country.  
From an administrative viewpoint, the HAS is a public entity regulated by an 
ad hoc law and funded by the Hungarian State.7 Its budget in 2014 was about 46 
billion forints, equivalent to 146 million euros.  
                                                 
6 A significant amount of research was also conducted in universities, which like the HAS, where de 
facto controlled by the Communist Party. 
7 In addition to the State’s endowment, which constitutes its primary source of funding, the HAS 
receives additional financing via grants and private donations. 
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The HAS can have a maximum of 365 members and to guarantee that those 
members are accomplished and prestigious scholars, the law establishes that no 
more than 200 among them be less than 70 years old. Elections of new HAS 
members are held every three years, and the number of new members to be elected 
is based on the number of members that have passed away since the previous 
election cycle. Members are elected as Corresponding Members and later promoted 
to Full Members, conditional on their scholarly achievements being worthy of such 
status. Promotion to full membership usually occurs after six years. The HAS 
members are appointed for life, and they receive a monthly stipend that is 
comparable in magnitude to, and can be combined with, a professional salary.8 As a 
result, reaching the HAS membership does not only constitute an honor, but also a 
significant professional and financial advancement for scholars who intend to work 
and live in Hungary. Indeed, one major reason for granting a stipend to HAS 
members is to motivate them to conduct their research in Hungary rather than 
seeking well payed positions in foreign universities.  
The HAS is articulated into eleven scientific divisions, each of them directed 
by a chair elected by the division’s members. The divisions are: Linguistics and 
Literary Studies, Philosophy and Historical Studies, Mathematical Sciences, 
Agricultural Sciences, Medical Sciences, Engineering Sciences, Chemical Sciences, 
Biological Sciences, Economics and Law, Earth Sciences, and Physical Sciences.  
Despite being a public organization, and unlike in much of its past history, the 
HAS currently enjoys full autonomy in selecting its membership, governing its 
activities, and allocating its budget. Regarding selection, new HAS members are 
nominated and elected by existing members, and neither the government nor other 
political institutions have formal powers to intervene in the process. The actual 
election procedure is described in detail in Chapter 4, which analyzes empirically 
the determinants of HAS elections’ outcomes, so I will not discuss it further here.  
Regarding governance, The HAS’s supreme body is the General Assembly, 
which is composed by all the HAS members, as well as the representatives of 
affiliated non-members, and has the power to elect officers, approve the budget, and 
modify the HAS statutes. In practice, the Assembly delegates most of its 
governance tasks to the Presidium, a 25 person council composed by the HAS 
                                                 
8 The monthly stipend of Corresponding Members of the HAS is 300,000 Forints, or 960 euros, 
while the stipend of Full Members is 400,000 Forints, or 1,280 euros. Hungary’s average monthly 
wage in 2014 was 532 euros. 
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officers, the chairs of the various scientific divisions, and additional members 
elected by the Assembly. In turn, the Presidium delegates executive and 
administrative tasks to the HAS officers—namely, the President, three vice 
Presidents, the Secretary General and the Secretary’s deputy. All the officers are 
elected by the General Assembly. 
Finally, regarding financial autonomy, the HAS’s budget is voted every year 
by the Hungarian Parliament, based on a proposal submitted by HAS. Once the 
budget is approved, the HAS has discretion to allocate it among its various 
activities. 
2.3. Relation of the HAS to other organizations and empirical relevance 
2.3.1. Relation of the HAS to other academic institutions 
Partly due to its unique historical heritage and evolution, the HAS performs 
both tasks that are typical of other Academies around the world (promoting 
scientific excellence, curating publications, advising the government on technical 
aspects of legislation) and tasks that are elsewhere performed by governmental 
organizations or universities (namely, directing and funding research centers and 
institutes nationwide, and releasing an academic title that is crucial for professors’ 
public accreditation).9 This accumulation of tasks, together with its independence 
from the government, makes the HAS a remarkably powerful institution in the 
governance of Hungary’s academic and scientific life, compared to its counterparts 
in other European countries. For instance, in Spain, research coordination is 
performed by an agency called Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
(CSIC), whose chief officers and a numerous Board members are chosen and 
appointed by the Government. Moreover, unlike the HAS, the Spanish CSIC does 
not have the power to release an academic degree crucial to obtaining full professor 
accreditations from ANECA, the national academic accreditation agency. Similarly 
                                                 
9 In the course of an interview, the Vice President of Hungary’s academic certification agency, 
Magyar Felsooktatasi Akkreditációs Bizottság (Hungarian Accreditation Committee, or HAC), 
reported to me that among candidates seeking the university professor accreditation, those who hold 
the Doctor of the Academy degree normally receive 100% of the points that the HAC is allowed to 
assign to research activity. The HAC Vice President also reported that, even though the law does not 
allow public universities to formally request the Doctor of the Academy degree as a pre-condition 
for obtaining a professor position, this degree often acts as an informal, de facto requirement, as 
nearly all full professors in Hungary’s major public universities (Budapest ELTE and BME, Szeged, 
and Debrecen) are Doctors of the HAS. Indeed, most HAC members are themselves Doctors of the 
HAS. 
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to the Spanish case, and in contrast with the Hungarian case, research coordination 
is handled by public agencies subject to significant governmental supervision in 
other major European Union countries such as France and Italy.10 In Germany, the 
main research coordination institution, the Max Planck Society, is more 
independent from public oversight than its Spanish, French or Italian counterparts, 
but it is less independent than the HAS, as governmental representatives sit in its 
supreme governing body.11 
In light of the above, studying the functioning and performance of the HAS 
seems relevant and instructive for understanding the public governance of scientific 
research and academia in Europe more generally. In particular, since the 
organization of the HAS—based on self-governance, internal cooptation of 
members and officers, and independence from political oversight—is significantly 
different from that of the public agencies that coordinate and accredit research in 
much of Central and Western Europe, assessing the performance of the HAS’s 
organizational model may inform public policy and reforms at the continental 
level.12 The insights gained from analyzing the Hungarian model are all the more 
relevant if one considers that despite its relatively small size (the total population is 
around ten million), Hungary has a long and consistent history of academic and 
scholarly excellence, as testified by its 13 Nobel laureates—which place Hungary 
17th in the inter-country ranking of Nobel Prizes per capita, and 14th in the ranking 
of Nobel Prizes per capita in Science (that is, excluding the Literature and Peace 
awards), above the European Union as a whole and just one per capita prize below 
the United States—and its 4 equivalent laureates in Mathematics (3 Wolf Prizes, 1 
Abel Prize). Many of these laureates were, or are, members of the HAS.13 
                                                 
10 In France, research coordination activities are primarily performed by the Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). In Italy, research coordination is assigned to the Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). The chief officers and several Board members of these institutions 
are chosen and appointed by the government. 
11 More information on the structure and governance of the public agencies in charge of coordinating 
research across Europe can be found on the website of the European Science Foundation 
(www.esf.org), an international association federating these agencies.  
12 As discussed above, the HAS’s current combination of functions and organizational structure was 
developed during Hungary’s Communist period, and it is similar to that in other European countries 
that belonged to the Eastern Bloc, such as Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
13 Many Hungarian laureates were professors in foreign universities, mostly in the United States, at 
the time of the award, but most of them received their scientific education in Hungary. 
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2.3.2. Relation of the HAS to non-academic organizations	
Another reason why the empirical study of the HAS conducted in this 
dissertation may have broad relevance is that some aspects of the HAS’s 
organizational structure are shared by important public organizations outside the 
academic and scientific arena. In terms of the general theoretical discussion of 
public bureaucracies provided in the first chapter of this thesis, the HAS is 
characterized by a rather extreme form of delegation, as it is unconstrained both in 
the way it performs the tasks assigned to it by the law and in the way it selects and 
renews its members. The only direct constraints on the HAS are the few ones 
established by its constitutive law—for instance, on the number and age distribution 
of members.14  
Important institutions, either public or performing public duties, are similarly 
organized in many European countries. For instance, in public universities the 
governing bodies are typically elected internally by faculty members, students and 
staff, rather than being appointed by public authorities.15 The judiciary selects its 
members through examinations primarily conducted by sitting judges (Bagues and 
Perez 2012), and elects its own governing council, in major civil law countries such 
as Spain and Italy. Similarly, in those countries, the associations empowered by the 
law to regulate the access to liberal professions such as those of attorney, notary or 
auditor, autonomously select their members and governing bodies. While there are 
important differences between the HAS on one side, and public universities, the 
judiciary, and professional associations on the other—in terms of their functions as 
well as of their size—some of the insight from the empirical analysis of the HAS’s 
organizational performance may usefully extend to those institutions.  
                                                 
14 Of course, as in any public organization, the Parliament and the Government may indirectly 
influence the HAS by threatening to modify its constitutive law or its budget. Neither threat would 
be easy to carry though: changing the constitutive law would require to gather the necessary political 
consensus, which may be challenging due to the HAS’s high reputation in the country, and as 
discussed before, the budget is based on a proposal formulated by the HAS. 
15 Unlike at the HAS, the selection of new members in European public universities is supervised 
and constrained by the law, either by requiring that new professors be pre-certified by public 
agencies like the Spanish ANECA, or that they be selected by an external committee following a 
publicly regulated formal procedure. 
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2.3.3. Relevance of the HAS as a means to test theories of public 
bureaucracies 
Finally, given its organizational structure, the HAS seems an ideal setting to 
empirically assess some of the theoretical analyses of public bureaucracies reviewed 
in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. On one hand, as discussed above, the HAS 
combines specialization and expertise of its members in carrying their functions 
with an extraordinary degree of autonomy from governmental and political control, 
as reflected both by the loose ex ante constraints on its operation (the constitutive 
law) and the absence of ex post supervision mechanisms. This combination of 
expertise and loose control is inconsistent with Weber’s (1921) emphasis on the 
need for detailed rules and procedures in the governance of public bureaucracies, 
whereas it is consistent with the tradeoff between expertise and authority posited by 
much of the recent literature.  
At the same time, many of the organizational features of the HAS seem to 
configure an informal incentive system for its members, in the spirit of some of the 
Weberian principles and, above all, of the transaction cost analysis of public 
bureaucracies in Williamson (1999). In particular, as proposed by both Weber and 
Williamson, members of the HAS are tenured for life, are awarded a salary that 
guarantees them economic security and independence, and are defined and 
perceived by society as an elite group with high prestige and honor.16 On the other 
hand, neither the compensation nor the career of HAS members is conditional on 
the achievement of explicitly defined performance objectives like those that are 
frequently used in private firms and organizations. The absence of clear 
performance incentives is particularly evident in the task of HAS members that is 
analyzed more closely in this thesis—namely, the selection of new members. In 
particular, since HAS members do not normally conduct their work, or otherwise 
interact on a systematic basis, within the Academy’s premises, and they do not 
perform scholarly teamwork as HAS members, their incentives to select excellent 
and capable new members are not enhanced by a concern for improving pool of 
future HAS colleagues.  
                                                 
16 In a poll conducted in 2007 by the Medián Public Poll and Market Research Institute to assess 
Hungarian citizens’ trust in various institutions, and available at 
http://www.median.hu/object.e257fe7d-1311-4a7a-86d4-d3dbd6a3fd48.ivy, the HAS ranked first, 
ahead of political institutions as well as the Police, the Army, and the Catholic Church. Similarly, the 
HAS ranked first in polls conducted in 2009 and 2013 by the TÁRKI Social Research Institute as 
part of an empirical study on the social and cultural conditions of economic growth in Hungary. The 
TÁRKI polls are available at http://www.tarki.hu/en/publications/ESR/2009/index.html.  
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According to Williamson (1999), the combination of flat salaries, tenured 
employment and the award of a quasi-aristocratic status to employees, which may 
be lost following an egregious miscarriage of duties, may create efficient incentives 
in public bureaucracies, where measuring output, and hence relying on explicit 
performance-related incentives, is generally more difficult than in business firms.17 
Understanding how the HAS members operate and perform, given the HAS’s 
hyper-decentralized and autonomous organizational structure and its lack of explicit 
incentives, may shed some light on whether this Weberian-Williamsonian 
theoretical model of public bureaucracy generates efficient or opportunistic 
behavior.  
                                                 
17 In a similar vein, Weber (1921) insists on the fact that public bureaucrats should not perceive their 
office as a means to make money, or as the supply of labor services in exchange for compensation, 
but rather as a vocation. 
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3.1. Environment, definitions, and assumptions 
In this section, I present a simple mathematical model of how motivation and 
opportunism determine the way recruiters in a public agency assess candidates. The 
model captures the most salient features of public bureaucracies modeled in the 
literature, and of the HAS in particular—namely, delegation of decision authority to 
the recruiter, the absence of output-based incentives, and the potential presence of 
implicit incentives due to intrinsic motivation, reputational concerns, and the like. 
As such, the model is a useful theoretical tool to guide the empirical analysis of the 
HAS’s recruitment patterns, which is developed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
Consider a representative recruiter, R, who must decide whether to select a 
candidate, C, as member of a public agency. While the model applies more 
generally, for the purposes of this dissertation I encourage readers to think of C as a 
scholar, and of R as a representative member of the HAS’s scientific division for 
which C is being nominated. I assume R is rational and risk-neutral, so that in 
making his selection decision, he maximizes his expected payoff, conditional on 
C’s observed characteristics. Consistent with the absence of explicit incentives for 
recruiters, I assume R receives from the public agency a fixed salary, which is high 
enough for R to be willing to work at the agency. 
Formally, R’s utility from working at the agency, net of the salary, is given 
by: 
ܷ ≡ ߶ݍ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ሻߨ ൅ ߟ	 if he selects C, and (3.1) 
଴ܷ ≡ ߟ଴ if he does not select C. (3.2) 
The variable ݍ denotes the contribution C may make to the public agency if 
selected, which I label quality. For instance, in the HAS case, ݍ might be the long-
term influence and prestige accruing to the HAS from C’s scholarship. In contrast, 
ߨ denotes the private benefit that selecting C may generate for R. Typically, ߨ will 
be large if R and C have an implicit, self-enforcing agreement such that C will 
compensate R if elected, and the more so the greater C’s potential ability to favor R. 
In the HAS context, this may be the case if outside the HAS, R and C are colleagues 
in a university where C has decision power or influence that he could use to favor 
R. Also, ߨ may be large if selecting C benefits R directly. For instance, following 
the previous HAS-related example, ߨ may be large if R and C are colleagues 
outside the HAS, so that R may want to make C a HAS member in order to boost 
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his university’s reputation, irrespective of C’s actual scientific quality. Both ݍ and ߨ 
are normally and independently distributed random variables with zero mean and 
unit variance.18 
The variables ߟ and ߟ଴, which are also normally and independently distributed 
with zero mean and unit variance, denote R’s satisfaction from working at the 
agency with or without a new member, respectively. I assume ߟ and ߟ଴ are 
independent on C’s characteristics ݍ and ߨ, that is, they only depend on the size of 
the agency, not on its composition. 
I assume R observes ߟ and ߟ଴, but does not observe C’s realized quality, ݍ, 
and the private benefit he could obtain by selecting C, ߨ. Instead, R observes 
unbiased but noisy signals of ݍ and ߨ, denoted as ݍ෤ and ߨ෤ , respectively, where: 
ݍ෤ ≡ ݍ ൅ ߝ௤, and (3.3) 
ߨ෤ ≡ ߨ ൅ ߝగ. (3.4) 
Being an expert, R knows that the error terms in the two signals, ߝ௤ and ߝగ, 
are normally and independently distributed with zero mean and variances ߪ௤ଶ and 
ߪగଶ, respectively, so that the two signals’ precisions are given by ݄௤ ≡ ଵఙ೜మ and ݄గ ≡
ଵ
ఙഏమ. To illustrate with the HAS example, one can think of ݍ෤ as R’s assessment of C’s 
scientific quality resulting from his past publications or citations, while ߨ෤  may 
reflect R’s assessment of C’s ability to favor him as resulting from his past 
relationship with C as a colleague or as a coauthor. 
In studying R’s selection decision, I assume that, consistent with the 
organizational structure of the HAS described in the previous chapter, the agency 
leaders delegate full recruitment authority to R. This implies that the agency 
commits to approve R’s selection decision, whatever this is.19 I also assume that the 
agency’s utility, net of R’s salary, is given by ݍ ൅ ߟ if C is recruited, and by ߟ଴ 
                                                 
18 Assuming normality, zero mean and unit variance is not necessary for the model’s results, but it 
greatly simplifies its notation and exposition. 
19 A number of theoretical models in the literature show that, under certain conditions, fully 
delegating decision authority to an informed expert is optimal from the organization’s viewpoint. For 
instance, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that delegation may optimally increase the expert’s 
incentives to acquire information on the available productive decisions. Dessein (2002) shows that 
even when the agent can credibly communicate some of his information to superiors, full delegation 
is often more efficient than allowing the superiors to approve or reject the agent’s recommendations. 
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otherwise.20 Then, for given ߟ and ߟ଴, if R sought to pursue the agency’s mission, 
he should select C if, and only if:  
ܧሾݍ|ݍ෤ሿ ൐ ߟ଴ െ ߟ. (3.5)  
Given the above assumptions on the agency’s mission and organization, 
parameter ߶ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ in R’s utility function measures, in reduced form, the extent to 
which R’s incentives are aligned with those of the agency. For instance, ߶ may be 
large if R is compelled to fulfill the agency’s objectives by his own ethical norms 
(intrinsic motivation), or by the fear that if he does not pursue the agency’s mission, 
he may lose status and reputation within his social or professional community.21 
When ߶ ൌ 1, R is fully motivated, whereas when ߶ ൌ 0, R is fully opportunistic.  
The timing of the recruitment process, summarized in Figure 3.1, is as 
follows: 
1. C’s characteristics, ݍ, ݍ෤, ߨ, and ߨ෤ , and the agency’s characteristics, ߟ and 
ߟ଴, are realized. 
2. R observes ݍ෤, ߨ෤, ߟ	and	ߟ଴. 
3. R decides whether to select C or not. 
4. R receives utility ܷ	if	he	selects	C, and	utility	 ଴ܷ otherwise. 
 
Figure 3.1. Timeline of events 
 
                                                 
20 Implicitly, I am assuming that the satisfaction of the agency’s leaders from working with or 
without a new member is the same as R’s satisfaction. 
21 Typically, this will be the case if the social status of R, conditional on acting in accordance with 
the agency’s mission, is high, as implied in Weber’s (1921) and Williamson’s (1999) view of civil 
service, and if R does not discount future payoffs or their loss too heavily.  
1. C’s characteristics 
q, B, q෤, B෩, ߟ, ߟ଴ are realized. 
2. R observes the signals q෤  
and B෩. 
3. R decides whether to select C or not. 
4. R receives utility ܷ if he selects C, 
and ߟ଴ otherwise. 
Time 
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3.2. Analyzing the recruiter’s selection decision 
R selects C if, and only if his expected utility from doing so, conditional on the 
observed characteristics, is higher than the expected utility from not selecting C. 
Formally, R selects C if, and only if: 
ܧሾܷ|ݍ෤, ߨ෤ሿ ൅ ߟ ൐ ߟ଴, which given the independence of the two signals, can be 
rewritten as 
߶ܧሾݍ|ݍ෤ሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߶ሻܧሾߨ|ߨ෤ሿ ൐ ߟ଴ െ ߟ. (3.6) 
Notice that unless ߶ ൌ 1, R’s decision will be different from the agency’s 
preferred decision implied by condition (3.5), as R will assign some weight to the 
private benefits he can obtain by recruiting C.  
It follows from the normal learning model (DeGroot 1970), applied to (3.6), 
that: 
ܧሾݍ|ݍ෤ሿ ൌ ௛೜௤෤ଵା௛೜, and (3.7) 
ܧሾߨ|ߨ෤ሿ ൌ ௛ഏగ෥ଵା௛ഏ. (3.8) 
Expressions (3.7) and (3.8) denote the two signals’ contributions to R’s 
assessment of C, and they have an intuitive interpretation: the higher a given 
signal’s precision, the higher that signal’s weight in R’s assessment. Substituting 
from (3.7) and (3.8) above, we can rewrite the selection condition (3.6) as: 
థ௛೜௤෤
ଵା௛೜ ൅
ሺଵିథሻ௛ഏగ෥
ଵା௛ഏ ൐ ߟ଴ െ ߟ. (3.9) 
Since the purpose of this model is to guide the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of HAS elections, it is useful at this point to take the perspective of an 
econometrician who observes the two signals, ݍ෤ and ߨ෤ , but does not observe any 
other characteristics of C (including ߟ଴ and ߟ), and given these informational 
restrictions, wants to study how changes in ݍ෤ and ߨ෤  and in their precisions, ݄௤ and 
݄గ, affect C’s probability of being recruited by R.  
Since ߟ଴ and ߟ are normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance, 
their difference, ߟ଴ െ ߟ, is also normally distributed with zero mean and unit 
variance. Let Φሺ∙ሻ be the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Then, 
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from condition (3.9), the probability that R selects C, as assessed by the 
econometrician, can be written as: 
݌൫ݍ෤, ߨ෤, ݄௤, ݄గ൯ ≡ ܲݎ ൬ߟ଴ െ ߟ ൏ థ௛೜௤෤ଵା௛೜ ൅
ሺଵିథሻ௛ഏగ෥
ଵା௛ഏ ൰ ൌ 	Φ ൬
థ௛೜௤෤
ଵା௛೜ ൅
ሺଵିథሻ௛ഏగ෥
ଵା௛ഏ ൰.  (3.10) 
3.3. Testable predictions on the Determinants of Recruitment Decisions 
By differentiating condition (3.10) above, we obtain testable predictions on how R’s 
choice depends on the observed signals, ݍ෤	and	ߨ෤. 
Proposition 1: The probability that recruiter R selects candidate C increases 
in the realized values of the quality signal ݍ෤	and	of	the	private	benefit	signal	ߨ෤ .  
Proof: In appendix. 
Similarly, by differentiating (3.10), we obtain testable predictions on how R’s 
choice depends on the precisions of the two signals, ݄௤	and	݄గ.  
Proposition 2: Conditional on recruiter R observing positive signals (ݍ෤ ൐ 0, 
ߨ෤ ൐ 0), the probability that R selects candidate C increases in the precision of the 
quality signal (parameter ݄௤), and in the precision of the private benefit signal 
(parameter ݄గ).  
Proof: In appendix. 
Intuitively, since R potentially cares both about C’s quality and about private 
benefits, R’s evaluation of C will be higher as R observes larger signals of these two 
variables, and as the observed signals become more precise. 
Another interesting question that can be answered by using the model 
developed above is whether R will on average place more weight on C’s quality 
signal or on the private benefit signal in making his selection decision. The 
proposition below shows that the answer to this question importantly depends on 
R’s degree of opportunism—that is, on the extent to which R’s interests are aligned 
(high levels of ߶) or misaligned (low levels of ߶) with those of the agency. 
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Proposition 3: Conditional on recruiter R observing positive signals (ݍ෤ ൐ 0, 
ߨ෤ ൐ 0), the probability that R selects candidate C increases more in the precision of 
the private benefit signal, ݄గ, than in the precision of the quality signal, ݄௤, if, and 
only if R is sufficiently opportunistic (that is, if ߶ is low enough).  
Proof: In appendix. 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is simple. If the recruiter is motivated to 
fulfill the public agency’s goals, he will primarily base his decision on quality-
related information. On the other hand, if the recruiter is opportunistic, he will place 
little weight on quality-related information, and great weight on information that 
relates to the candidate’s ability to generate private benefits for him. As we will see 
in the next chapter, Proposition 3 above is especially useful to test empirically for 
the presence of opportunism in the choices of HAS recruiters. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Mathematical proofs 
Proposition 1: The probability that recruiter R selects candidate C increases 
in the realized values of the quality signal ݍ෤	and	of	the	private	benefit	signal	ߨ෤ . 
Proof: Recall that the probability of C being selected, given by condition 
(3.10), is 
݌൫ݍ෤, ߨ෤, ݄௤, ݄గ൯ ≡ 	Φ൬థ௛೜௤෤ଵା௛೜ ൅
ሺଵିథሻ௛ഏగ෥
ଵା௛ഏ ൰. (A1) 
Suppressing the argument of Φሺ∙ሻ for simplicity, the marginal effects of 
increases in ݄௤ and ݄గ on the selection probability are then given by the following 
partial derivatives: 
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௤෤ ൌ Φ′ሺ∙ሻ
థ௛೜
ଵା௛೜, and (A2) 
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డగ෥ ൌ Φ′ሺ∙ሻ
ሺଵିథሻ௛ഏ
ଵା௛ഏ . (A3) 
The expressions in (A2) and (A3) are both non-negative because the normal 
cumulative distribution function is monotonically increasing (Φᇱሺ∙ሻ ൐ 0), ߶ is non-
negative, and the signals’ precisions, ݄௤ and ݄గ, are positive numbers.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2: Conditional on recruiter R observing positive signals (ݍ෤ ൐ 0, 
ߨ෤ ൐ 0), the probability that R selects candidate C increases in the precision of the 
quality signal (parameter ݄௤), and in the precision of the private benefit signal 
(parameter ݄గ).  
Proof: The marginal effects of increases in ݄௤ and ݄గ on the selection 
probability are then given by the following partial derivatives: 
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛೜ ൌ Φ′ሺ∙ሻ
థ௤෤
൫ଵା௛೜൯మ
, and (A4) 
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛ഏ ൌ Φ′ሺ∙ሻ
ሺଵିథሻగ෥
ሺଵା௛ഏሻమ. (A5) 
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Conditional on ݍ෤ ൐ 0 and ߨ෤ ൐ 0, the expressions in (A4) and (A5) are both 
non-negative because the normal cumulative distribution function is monotonically 
increasing (Φᇱሺ∙ሻ ൐ 0), ߶ is non-negative, and the signals’ precisions, ݄௤ and ݄గ, 
are positive numbers. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3: Conditional on recruiter R observing positive signals (ݍ෤ ൐ 0, 
ߨ෤ ൐ 0), the probability that R selects candidate C increases more in the precision of 
the private benefit signal, ݄గ, than in the precision of the quality signal, ݄௤, if and 
only if R is sufficiently opportunistic (that is, if ߶ is low enough).  
Proof: From (A4) and (A5), డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯డ௛ഏ ൐
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛೜  if, and only if: 
ሺଵିథሻగ෥
ሺଵା௛ഏሻమ ൐
థ௤෤
൫ଵା௛೜൯మ
. (A6) 
When ߶ ൌ 0, condition (A6) holds for all sets of parameters. When ߶ ൌ 1, 
condition (A6) does not hold for any set of parameters. Moreover, a marginal 
increase in ߶ reduces the left-hand side of (A6) while increasing the right-hand 
side, thereby making condition (A6) tighter. Hence, there must be a critical 
threshold ߶ such that డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯డ௛ഏ ൐
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛೜  for ߶ ൏ ߶, whereas 
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛ഏ ൏
డ௣൫௤෤,గ෥,௛೜,௛ഏ൯
డ௛೜  for ߶ ൐ ߶.  
Q.E.D. 
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4.1. Description of the database 
I begin the empirical investigation of recruitment at the HAS by describing my 
dataset, with particular emphasis on how the relevant measures have been 
constructed. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the HAS consists of 11 scientific divisions. A 
scientific division is a unit of the HAS, and it reflects a branch of science that 
embraces related scientific fields. Members of the HAS divisions can be elected 
among Hungarian citizens who: 1) are distinguished scholars in their field, 2) hold a 
Doctor of the Academy degree or another equivalent scientific degree, and 3) are 
nominated by a minimum number of domestic HAS members22. While domestic 
HAS members can nominate candidates across scientific divisions, as we will see in 
a moment, they have the right to vote only in the election of candidates that belong 
to their own division. For instance, a HAS member belonging to the Medicine 
division can nominate candidates for the Biology division, but he/she cannot affect 
the election of Biology candidates. Nominations are published in the Fall preceding 
the election year by the journal Magyar Tudomány (Hungarian Science), and they 
are also posted on the HAS website (www.mta.hu). 
In the election’s first phase, HAS members in each scientific division pre-
select nominees by casting a secret ballot for each one of them, with possible votes 
of “yes”, “no”, or “abstain.” Nominees are then ranked based on the share of “yes” 
votes received. If two or more nominees receive exactly the same “yes” votes, then 
the one with the lowest share of “no” votes is ranked first. Only nominees who 
obtain a share of at least 50% “yes” votes in this pre-selection round can be elected 
as HAS members. The HAS Presidium then announces the maximum number of 
new members that can be assigned to each division (on average, two to three), after 
which a final vote of all the HAS members determines the candidates who are 
actually elected. While all HAS members participate to the final vote, there is an 
informal agreement whereby the ranking of candidates decided in the first phase by 
                                                 
22 Detailed information on nomination requirements can be found in the HAS’s bylaws 
(http://mta.hu/data/cikk/10/52/51/cikk_105251/Aggregate_Academy_Law_20120803.pdf, p. 13). 
The necessary number of nominations for membership and the number of nominations any one 
domestic member can make is determined by the Presidium before the nomination process starts. In 
the past three cycles the necessary number of nominations for corresponding membership has been 
set at three. Further detail can be found in the document of the Academy´s 184th General Assembly 
(http://mta.hu/data/MTA_tagjai/akademikusvalasztas_eljarasi_szabalyzata_vegl_2013.pdf). 
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the scientific divisions is not reversed by the plenum, so that new members are de 
facto elected by the scientific division for which they have been nominated. 
My empirical analysis covers all the candidates nominated for HAS 
membership in 8 scientific divisions (Mathematics, Medicine, Engineering, 
Chemistry, Biology, Economics and Law, Earth Sciences, and Physics), and across 
four election cycles (2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013). Three scientific divisions 
(Linguistics and Literature, Phylosophy and History, and Agronomics) were 
excluded from the analysis because the bibliometric measures of scholarly output 
that I use to proxy for candidates’ objective quality are either unavailable there 
(Linguistics and Literature, Philosophy and History) or, according to representative 
scholars I have interviewed, they are unreliable due to the high heterogeneity of 
publication and citation patterns across multiple subfields (Agronomics). This 
results in a total number of 476 candidate-year-division observations, which 
constitute the basis for my empirical analysis. 
4.2. Description of the measures 
4.2.1. Introduction 
For the set of candidates described above, I have used data from 
heterogeneous sources to construct variables that can be grouped into three 
categories, depending on their intended use in the empirical analysis: 1) measures of 
a candidate’s observed scientific quality (the ݍ෤ signal in the model); 2) measures of 
a candidate’s personal and professional connections with voting members of his 
HAS division (as we shall see in a moment, these may relate to both the quality 
signal, ݍ෤, and the private benefit signal, ߨ෤); and 3) measures of a candidate’s other 
characteristics that may affect his election prospects, and hence can be used as 
control variables in regression analysis. 
To choose the measures to be included in each category, I have used the 
related empirical literature as a guideline whenever possible. In addition, I have 
asked distinguished members of the HAS to confirm the validity of the chosen 
measures in my empirical setting. To this purpose, I have conducted in-depth 
individual interviews with at least 2 HAS members for seven of the eight scientific 
divisions included in this study, amounting to a total of 25 interviews. Since there 
are 264 HAS members in those divisions, my interviews cover about 10% of the 
relevant HAS membership. 
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I describe the chosen measures in the next paragraph, below. A detailed 
discussion of the methodology I have followed to construct these measures from my 
database is provided in section 4.3. Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
for the variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Table 4.1. Measures and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Electionit  Selection = 1 if candidate i selected into the Academy 
in election cycle t; Selection = 0 if candidate not 
selected 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Citationsit Cumulative citations of candidate i’s articles in the 
Web of Science at the beginning of election cycle t 
889.27 1307.3 0 13158 
Coauthorsit Total number of candidate i’s coauthors who are sitting 
in his selection committee in election cycle t 
2.16 1.94 0 12 
Colleaguesit Total number of selection committee members in 
election cycle t who work in the same institution as 
candidate i 
7.05 7.24 0 30 
D-Colleaguesit Total number of selection committee members in 
election cycle t who work in the same institution and 
department as candidate i 
3.73 4.10 0 18 
Ageit Age of candidate i at the beginning of election cycle t 
(years) 
57.01 6.69 38 83 
Times-Candidateit Number of times candidate i has been nominated as a 
candidate before election cycle t 
1.96 1.03 1 6 
Endorsersit Total number of candidate i’s endorsers at the 
beginning of election cycle t 
3.81 1.48 2 12 
Field-Endorsersit Total number of candidate i’s endorsers at the 
beginning of election cycle t who belong to candidate 
i’s scientific field 
1.93 1.43 0 6 
Number of observations = 476. 
4.2.2. Measures of scientific quality 
As my baseline measure of candidates’ observed quality, I use Citationsit, the 
total number of cumulative citations to publications of candidate i up to election 
year t. Cumulative citations are widely used in the literature as a measure of 
scientific quality (e.g., Hamermesh and Schmidt 2003; Combes et al. 2008; 
Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015; Azoulay et al. 2014). While some of the HAS 
members I have interviewed expressed skepticism on the validity of citations 
indicators, and even of bibliometric measures in general, most of them concurred in 
that bibliometric indices are overall an acceptable, if partial, measure of scientific 
achievement, and that if a bibliometric measure is to be used, the number of 
citations is probably the most appropriate one.  
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Table 4.2. Correlations table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Election –            
2 Citations 0.10 –           
3 Colleagues 0.08 0.05 –          
4 Coauthors 0.04 0.14 0.12 –         
5 Endorsers 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.21 –        
6 Age -0.15 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 –       
7 Times-Candidate 0.14 0.002 -0.009 0.02 0.28 0.29 –      
8 Field-Endorsers 0.23 0.08 0.04 0.16 0.47 -0.13 0.19 –     
9 D-Colleagues 0.14 0.02 0.60 0.15 0.15 -0.08 0.09 0.30 –    
10 L-Citations -0.11 -0.35 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.10 -0.15 -0.02 –   
11 H-Citations 0.01 0.76 0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.11 –  
12 H-Index 0.11 0.88 0.04 0.16 0.11 -0.10 0.04 0.13 0.04 -0.44 0.60 – 
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At the same time, some interviewees pointed out that since most candidates 
are distinguished scholars in their fields, marginal differences in their cumulative 
citations may be a noisy measure of quality differences, and hence may have a 
tenuous effect on the election outcomes. To take this consideration into account, I 
use as complementary measures of observed scientific quality H-Citationsit, a 
dummy for whether candidate i in year t is in the top 10% citation percentile, and L-
Citationsit, a dummy for whether candidate i in year t is in the bottom 10% citation 
percentile.  
In addition, some of the interviewed HAS members argued that because most 
candidates to the HAS membership are fairly established scholars with extensive 
publication records, it may be useful to use a measure of scientific achievement that 
takes both citations and publication volumes into account. Based on this 
recommendation, I also use H-Indexit, the h-index of candidate i in year t, as an 
alternative measure of scientific quality. The h-index is the highest number x of a 
scholar’s publications such that each of those publications has at least x citations. 
4.2.3. Measures of connections 
Following Combes et al. (2008) and Zynovieva and Bagues (2015), I use as 
measures of connections Coauthorsit, the number of coauthors of candidate i who 
are voting members of his scientific division in election year t, and Colleaguesit, the 
number of voting members who work in the same institution as candidate i in 
election year t. As an additional, and related, measure of connections, I also use D-
Colleaguesit, the number of voting members who work both in the same institution 
and in the same department as candidate i in election year t. 
4.2.4. Control variables  
As in previous empirical works (e.g., Hamermesh and Schmidt 2003; Combes 
et al. 2008; Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015), I include in my analysis the following 
candidate characteristics as control variables: Endorsersit, the number of Academy 
members who are endorsing candidate i in election year t, Field-Endorsersit, the 
number of Academy members from the same scientific field as candidate i who are 
endorsing him in election year t, Times-Candidateit, the number of times i has been 
a candidate in election years prior to t, and Ageit, the age of candidate i in election 
year t.  
According to the interviewed HAS members, controlling for the number of 
endorsers is relevant because candidates with many endorsers may be (or perceived 
by voting HAS members to be) more established within the scientific community 
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and hence they may stand higher chances to be elected. This is all the more likely if 
the endorsements come from scholars in the candidate’s same research field. A 
similar reasoning applies to candidates who have been repeatedly up for election, 
and hence have managed to consistently mobilize endorsements despite their 
ultimate failure at the election ballot. Some of the interviewed HAS members also 
pointed out that within a given scientific division, candidates who receive more 
endorsements from their subfield of research stand higher chances of being elected, 
because voting members from other subfields interpret support from within the 
field, or lack thereof, as a signal of quality. Finally, the interviewees pointed out 
that controlling for age is important, because elderly scholars are less willing or less 
capable to invest effort in the more time-consuming activities performed by the 
HAS, such as coordinating research institutes or assigning the Doctor of the 
Academy degree, and this may lead voting members to prefer younger candidates, 
even at the cost of sacrificing the extra prestige that a more senior scholar may 
bring to the HAS. Moreover, younger scholars may have the additional advantage 
of being more acquainted with up-to-date techniques in fields, such as physics and 
chemistry, where research methodologies change at a fast pace. 
4.3. Construction of the measures 
4.3.1. Introduction 
I have tracked the research life trajectory of candidates, endorsers, and voting 
members of the HAS from the time they obtained their Master degree until the year 
2013, which is the most recent election cycle in my database. To identify 
candidates’ relevant characteristics—namely, their institution and department 
affiliation and their research fields—I have relied on their CVs and biographic notes 
as published on the HAS website, as well as on targeted Google searches.  
To measure citations, as well as to identify coauthorship between candidates 
and the HAS’s voting members, I have collected publication records from the ISI 
Web of Science (hereafter, the WOS), which is the most widely used and credited 
international repository of bibliometric data, and from the Hungarian Scientific 
Bibliography (hereafter, the Academy Database)—a comprehensive national 
database of scientific publications and citations of Hungarian scientists maintained 
by the HAS.  
An attractive feature of the Academy Database is that, unlike the WOS and 
other international databases, it employs a quality control system that 
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unambiguously links publications to authors by checking the validity of the 
uploaded publications. Unfortunately, the information reported in the Academy 
Database is incomplete because prior to 2007, candidates and HAS members were 
not obliged to upload their publications into the Academy Database. Properly 
reporting publications is in the interest of candidates irrespective of whether it is 
mandatory, and in fact, publication records as complete as those in the WOS are 
available for 95% of candidates in the four election cycles I analyze. However, 
publication records for HAS members, which are essential to assess their 
coauthorship relations with candidates, are far less complete, especially for those 
who have been members for more than 15 years. For these reasons, I have chosen to 
rely on the WOS citation data, using the Academy Database data, whenever 
possible, to check that the WOS citations are correctly attributed to authors, as 
explained below. 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, I conclude this section by discussing 
in greater detail the procedures I have used to attribute affiliations, research 
subfields, and citations to scholars. 
4.3.2. Assigning affiliations and research subfields to scholars 
I have considered up to three institutional affiliations per scholar. I have 
restricted attention to institutions with extended periods of full-time affiliation, 
excluding short research stays. While a few scholars in the database have changed 
workplace over time, work mobility for scientists is overall quite limited, and as a 
consequence, most scholars have only one institutional affiliation. When 
constructing the Colleagues variable, I have summed up the members of a 
candidate’s HAS scientific division who have the same affiliation as the candidate 
across all of the candidate’s affiliations, counting each colleague only once. 
Formally, let candidate ݅ be affiliated in any given year to ܯ institutions, and let ௝ܰ 
be the set of ݅’s colleagues from institution ݆ ∈ ܯ who are members of the HAS’s 
section for which ݅ is a candidate. Then, ݅’s total number of colleagues in the 
relevant year is given by:  
ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜ ൌ ∑ ∑ ݇௞∈ேೕ
௞∉ேೕషభ
௝∈ெ . 
Regarding research subfields, I have assigned them to each scholar based on 
the following procedure. First, I have assigned HAS members to subfields based on 
their HAS Scientific Committee affiliation as reported in the biographic notes on 
the HAS webpage. Scientific committees are groups within the HAS’s scientific 
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divisions, which represent one or more subfields of science.23 A minimum of one 
and a maximum of three committee affiliations are reported in the webpage. I have 
relied on the individual interviewees with HAS members to check whether my 
classification of subfields reflects scientific conventions, and I have adjusted the 
assignment of scholars to subfields based on their recommendations. 
4.3.3. Assigning WOS citations to authors  
Identifying publications in the WOS, and in publication databases more 
generally, is not an easy task. For each publication and author, the WOS provides 
information on the surname, on the first name’s initial and, in some cases, on the 
middle names’ initials. Problems with homonymity may thus arise in the quite 
frequent case of common surnames. In particular, as discussed by Azoulay et al. 
(2014), one should worry about Type I errors, whereby a scientist is erroneously 
classified as the author of a journal article actually written by a namesake, and Type 
II errors, whereby legitimate articles are excluded from a scientist’s publication list. 
These errors mainly arise because certain scholars’ surnames are highly common, 
because scientists often use middle initials, as well as suffixes, inconsistently, and 
also, because multiple patronyms are sometimes used due to changes in marital 
status. In this study, I have addressed these concerns by relying on a fairly complex 
matching procedure, whose steps are summarized below.  
First, I have used the WOS search engine to download references to all the 
publications under a given author’s name. For authors whose first name has more 
than one letter (by far the majority), the WOS only allows to include in the search 
engine the initial letter of the first name, followed by a star. This procedure results 
in too many publications being attributed to the author under study, and therefore it 
requires some filtering. Let me illustrate the problem and the filtering with an 
example. For author “Kovacs Peter”, the search was performed by issuing query 
“Kovacs P*” in the search engine. The resulting output was given by references to 
the articles published by all scholars whose surname is “Kovacs” and whose first 
name begins by “P”. Ideally, one would want, at this point, to download each article 
and check whether the author’s first name is “Peter”. However, adopting this 
procedure for all authors would be prohibitively time-consuming given the high 
total volume of articles. Instead, as a first filtering, I have excluded from the 
                                                 
23 Detailed information on Scientific Committees can be found in the HAS’s bylaws 
(http://mta.hu/data/cikk/10/52/51/cikk_105251/Aggregate_Academy_Law_20120803.pdf, p. 44).  
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“Kovacs Peter” reference list all publications where the author’s first name, as 
abbreviated in the reference returned by the WOS search engine, included the initial 
letter “P” followed by any letter other than “e”. As a result, references where the 
author is abbreviated as “Kovacs P.” were included in the list, but references where 
the author’s name is abbreviated as “Kovacs Pa.” were excluded. 
As a second step, I have compared the titles of publications tentatively 
attributed to a given scholar based on the above procedure, with that scholar’s 
publications as reported in the Academy Database, and I have excluded the 
publications that did not match from the list. Since the title of a given publication is 
sometimes reported with slightly different wording in the WOS and the Academy 
databases, I have assessed matching between titles by applying a correction 
procedure known as fuzzy matching or approximate string matching.24 According to 
such procedure, I have computed the share of matching words in any pair of titles 
over the total number of words in the two titles, and I have considered titles that 
were 90 percent matching according to this criterion as referring to the same 
publication.  
In the final step, I have downloaded from the list of WOS references 
attributed to an author, as filtered in the previous two steps, some additional, author-
specific information provided by the WOS reference output—namely, the author’s 
affiliation, WOS research field, and reported research address. I have then used this 
additional information to identify WOS publications that were not reported in the 
Academy Database, but whose referred author affiliation, address and research 
field, matched those in the scholar’s list of references constructed in the previous 
steps. 
4.3.4. Self-citations 
My Citations variable includes all the citations to a scholar’s WOS articles 
that appear in other WOS articles, including the focal scholar’s ones—that is, the 
variable includes self-citations. While excluding self-citations may provide a better 
measure of a scholar’s scientific contribution, it may also magnify the classification 
errors discussed above. Moreover, some studies have shown that self-citations do 
                                                 
24 A brief explanation on fuzzy matching can be found here 
https://www.melissadata.com/deduplication/what-is-fuzzy-matching.htm and sample program 
coding can be found here https://pypi.python.org/pypi/fuzzywuzzy.  
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not significantly influence analyses based on bibliometric measures, provided that a 
large enough number of publications is explored (Glänzel 2003, p. 57).  
As a partial robustness check, I have explored the correlation between total 
citations and independent citations (that is, total citations minus self-citations) in the 
Academy’s public database, where the two citation counts are separately reported. 
The observed correlation is above 0.90. Based on these considerations and findings, 
I have decided to measure scholars’ citations by the total number of WOS citations 
in my study, without attempting to correct for self-citations. 
4.3.5. Validity of the WOS citation data  
The WOS database includes over 10,000 high-impact, peer-refereed journals 
in Science, Engineering, Medicine, and Social Sciences, as well as international 
proceedings that cover over 100,000 conferences. While using the WOS database to 
construct measures of the objective quality of scholars seems reasonable given its 
selectivity, the WOS bibliometric indicators also suffer from a number of 
shortcomings, which members of the HAS have pointed out in the course of our 
interviews.  
First, publication and citation trends, as well as coauthorship, vary sharply 
across fields (e.g., Economics vs. Management) and subfields (e.g., Industrial 
Organization vs. Development Economics, or Strategic Management vs. Operations 
Research). Second, a given scientist’s research may span multiple subfields, each 
characterized by different publication and citation patterns. Finally, there are fields, 
such as Law and Earth Studies, where publications that are not listed in the WOS 
database, such as books with national or regional relevance, are considered 
important.  
In the light of these considerations, one would ideally want to construct 
indices of publication quality that include local books and give the appropriate 
weight to each publication type (journal articles, books, and conference 
proceedings), depending on the scholar’s field. This would require to augment the 
WOS data with citation databases that include local books and, most importantly, it 
would require to establish field-specific weights that may introduce some degree of 
subjectivity into the analysis. For these reasons, I have decided to rely on the 
unweighted WOS data in the analysis of election outcomes across all scientific 
divisions, which is the focus of this chapter. In Chapter 5, I complement the 
analysis conducted here by investigating how more customized citation data that 
have been suggested by the interviewed HAS members separately affect the 
analysis of election outcomes within each division. 
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4.4. Empirical strategy 
4.4.1. Testable hypotheses 
The dataset described in the previous section includes a widely used measure 
of the scientific output of academic scholars—namely, their cumulative number of 
citations at the time they are being considered for election into the HAS. In terms of 
my theoretical model, citations can be interpreted as an observable signal of a 
candidate’s scientific quality. Proposition 1 in the model predicts that a recruiter 
who cares, at least partially, about candidates’ quality is more willing to select a 
candidate the higher the observed signal of his quality. Based on this proposition, I 
formulate the following testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a nominated candidate is elected as a 
member of the HAS increases in his cumulative number of citations. 
Proposition 2 in the theoretical model also predicts that a candidate’s 
probability of being selected should increase when the recruiter’s signals of the 
candidate’s quality, and of his ability to generate private benefits for the recruiter, 
become more precise. My dataset includes measures of the extent to which a 
candidate and his evaluators in the HAS are connected—in particular, whether they 
are coauthors or colleagues in the same institution or department. As discussed in 
the literature (Combes et al. 2008; Li 2012; Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015), high 
levels of connection may indicate that the evaluators are biased towards the 
candidate because of private and opportunistic reasons, that they have precise 
information about the candidate, or both. Thus, my model predicts that whichever 
their interpretation, connections should increase a candidate’s probability of being 
elected into the HAS. 
Hypothesis 2: The probability that a nominated candidate is elected as a 
member of the HAS increases in the number of that candidate’s coauthors and 
colleagues who belong to the HAS at the time of the election.  
Evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2 would indicate that non-verifiable, soft 
characteristics of a candidate, and not only objective quality, affect his chances to 
be elected. However, such evidence would not be informative on which soft 
characteristics of a candidate—unobservable quality or his private value for the 
evaluator—matter more. From a governance viewpoint, this is an important issue, 
because if recruiters’ choices can be attributed, at least in part, to bias and 
opportunism, it may be desirable to prevent them from voting on those candidates, 
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or to enact other reforms of the HAS organizational rules that reduce the discretion 
of recruiters.  
To test for the presence of opportunism in the behavior of HAS recruiters 
despite the potentially ambiguous interpretation of connections, I exploit the 
different nature of the two types of academic connections measured in my 
database—namely, coauthorship and common workplace. Coauthors repeatedly 
interact and coordinate on scholarly and scientific matters that are relevant to their 
joint projects. As a result, coauthors are likely to develop a fairly precise opinion on 
each other’s scientific quality and depth, research skills, and potential scholarly 
influence in their common fields. In contrast, the scientific interaction between 
colleagues is typically less frequent and direct than that between coauthors: even 
within the same academic department, colleagues may belong to different subfields 
or research groups, and hence they may have more limited chances to share and 
discuss the specifics of their research projects, or to question each other in seminars. 
At the same time, colleagues are more likely than coauthors to interact along non-
scholarly dimensions such as university or departmental internal politics and 
recruitment decisions. Importantly, these non-scholarly dimensions of the 
relationship between colleagues can create the potential for exchanges of favors, or 
the expectation of such exchanges to occur in the future. For instance, one 
influential colleague may help another to be elected Department Chair, Dean or 
Rector, to have his preferred job market candidates hired, to be assigned desired 
courses to teach, or to get an expensive research project approved and funded by the 
organization. Moreover, as discussed before, a HAS member who benefits from his 
university’s reputation may be more willing to elect a colleague from the same 
university as HAS member, irrespective of his quality, simply because being HAS 
member is a honor that positively affects the parent university’s reputation. 
In terms of my theoretical model, the above discussion suggests that a HAS 
member: 1) can less precisely assess the scientific quality of a colleague than that of 
a coauthor (that is, coauthorship implies a higher precision of the quality signal, 
݄௤); 2) can more precisely assess the private benefits he may obtain from electing a 
colleague than those he may obtain from electing a coauthor (that is, coauthorship 
implies a lower precision of the private benefit signal, ݄గ); and 3) is more likely to 
obtain private benefits from electing a colleague than from electing a coauthor (that 
is, coauthorship implies a lower value of the private benefit signal, ߨ෤). To derive 
testable hypotheses from these observations, it is convenient to formalize the 
analysis using the notation of the theoretical model from Chapter 3. 
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Let ܣ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ be an indicator for whether recruiter R is a coauthor of 
candidate C (in which case ܣ ൌ 1), and let ܹ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ be an indicator for whether R 
is a workplace colleague of C (in which case ܹ ൌ 1). Let ∆௤஺ and ∆௤ௐ be the 
increases in ݄௤ when R is C’s coauthor or colleague, respectively. Let ∆గ஺ and ∆గௐ 
be the increases in ݄గ when R is C’s coauthor or colleague, respectively. Finally, let 
∆గ෥஺ and ∆గ෥ௐ be the increases in ߨ෤  when R is C’s coauthor or colleague, respectively. 
Observation 1) corresponds to assuming that ∆௤஺൐ ∆௤ௐ൐ 0. Observation 2) 
corresponds to assuming that ∆గௐ൒ ∆గ஺൐ 0. Finally, observation 3) corresponds to 
assuming that ∆గ෥ௐ൐ ∆గ෥஺൒ 0. Then, being C’s colleague increases R’s probability to 
select C more than being C’s coauthor if, and only if:  
݌ሺܹ ൌ 1ሻ െ ݌ሺܹ ൌ 0ሻ ൐ ݌ሺܣ ൌ 1ሻ െ ݌ሺܣ ൌ 0ሻ,  
where ݌ሺ∙ሻ is the probability that C is selected, with the arguments from Chapter 3 
dropped for notational simplicity. Substituting from condition (3.10) in Chapter 3, 
the above condition can be rewritten as:  
Φ′ሺ∙ሻ ൤డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿడ௛ഏ ∆గ
ௐ ൅ డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿడ௛೜ ∆௤
ௐ ൅ డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿడగ෥ ∆గ෥ௐ൨ ൐ Φ′ሺ∙ሻ ൤
డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿ
డ௛ഏ ∆గ
஺ ൅
డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿ
డ௛೜ ∆௤
஺൨,  
or 
డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿ
డ௛ഏ ሺ∆గ
ௐ െ ∆గ஺ሻ ൅ డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿడగ෥ ∆గ෥ௐ൐
డாሾ௎|௤෤,గ෥ሿ
డ௛೜ ൫∆௤
஺ െ ∆௤ௐ൯. 
Substituting the partial derivatives computed in the proofs of Propositions 1 
and 2 (see the appendix to Chapter 3), the above condition can be further rewritten 
as: 
ሺଵିథሻగ෥ൣ∆ഏೈି∆ഏಲାሺଵା௛ഏሻ∆ഏ෥ೈ൧
ሺଵା௛ഏሻమ ൐
థ௤෤ൣ∆೜ಲି∆೜ೈ൧
൫ଵା௛೜൯మ
.     (4.1) 
Proposition 3, together with the assumptions that ∆గௐ൒ ∆గ஺, ∆௤஺൐ ∆௤ௐ and ∆గ෥ௐ൐
0, implies that condition (4.1) above holds if, and only if R is sufficiently 
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opportunistic—that is, if ߶ is small enough. This observation allows me to 
formulate the following two testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Suppose the HAS recruiters are sufficiently opportunistic (low 
enough ߶). Then, the probability that a nominated candidate is elected as 
member of the HAS increases more in his number of HAS colleagues than in 
his number of HAS coauthors. 
Hypothesis 4: Suppose the HAS recruiters are not too opportunistic (high 
enough ߶). Then, the probability that a nominated candidate is elected as 
member of the HAS increases less in his number of HAS colleagues than in 
his number of HAS coauthors. 
Evidence consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3—and hence inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 4—would indicate that, even though connections may increase both the 
HAS recruiters’ ability to act opportunistically (a destructive effect) and their ability 
to assess candidates (a productive effect), at least part of the observed effect of 
connections on the HAS election outcomes should be attributed to recruiters’ 
opportunism.25 
4.4.2. Identification 
To test the hypotheses discussed above, I alternatively estimate the following 
two regression equations: 
ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߛଵܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ߛଶܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ࣒ᇱࢆ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧. (4.2) 
ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧ ൅ ߛଵܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ߛଶܦ-ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ࣒ᇱࢆ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧. (4.3) 
The dependent variable, ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧, is a dummy that takes value 1 if 
candidate i is elected as a HAS member in year t, and value zero if the candidate is 
not elected. ܥ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧, the cumulative number of WOS citations received by 
candidate i up to election year t, is my measure of candidates’ observable quality 
signal. Since different disciplines may exhibit different citation patterns, I normalize 
the citation count by subtracting from it the sample mean of the HAS’s scientific 
                                                 
25 See Bagues and Perez (2013) for a comprehensive model of the relationship between recruiters’ 
similarity to candidates in terms of expertise and their evaluation of those candidates.  
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division to which the candidate is assigned, and dividing it by the standard 
deviation.  
ܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧, ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ and ܦ‐ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ are the measures of 
coauthorship and colleague relationships described in the previous sections of this 
chapter. I alternatively measure relationships between colleagues at the institution 
level (equation 4.1) and at the department level (equation 4.2) to account for the 
possibility that working in the same university may not imply significant personal 
interactions when the university is large. ࢆ௜௧ is the vector of the candidate’s 
characteristics that are used as control variables—namely, the candidate’s number 
of endorsers (Endorsersit) and endorsers from the same field (Field-Endorsersit), the 
cumulative number of times the candidate has been up for election in previous years 
(Times-Candidateit), the candidate’s age (Ageit), as well as fixed effects for the 
HAS’s scientific division for which the candidate is nominated, and for the relevant 
election year. Finally, ݑ௜௧ and ݒ௜௧ are random error terms, which are assumed to be 
i.i.d. and normally distributed with zero mean, and ߙ, ߚ, ߛଵ, ߛଶ, and ࣒, are 
coefficients to be estimated. Notice that Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict ߚ ൐ 0, ߛଵ ൐ 0, 
and ߛଶ ൐ 0, Hypothesis 3 predicts ߛଶ ൐ ߛଵ, and Hypothesis 4 predicts ߛଵ ൐ ߛଶ. 
One potential concern in estimating equations (4.1) and (4.2) is endogeneity. 
As in Combes et al. (2008), Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003), and other related 
studies—and unlike in Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015)—potential candidates and 
their endorsers know the identity of evaluators before nominations are advanced, 
which implies that evaluators are not randomly assigned to candidates. Moreover, 
even if candidates were nominated by their endorsers independently of the 
evaluators’ identity, it could be that candidates of higher quality have higher-level 
academic connections, and hence are more likely to have coauthors and colleagues 
among the HAS members. If this were the case, the variables 
ܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧, ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧	and	ܦ-ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ might be correlated with the error 
terms in equations (4.1) and (4.2), leading to potentially inconsistent estimates of 
the coefficients of interest (Wooldridge 2010). 
A priori, these potential endogeneity problems seem less severe in the HAS 
elections than in the public universities’ examinations studied by Combes et al. 
(2008) and Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015). First, since HAS members are elected for 
life and few new members (on average, two to three) are added in each election 
cycle, a candidate in a given election year is likely to face a very similar pool of 
evaluators in the following election year, in case he, or his endorsers, decides to 
postpone the candidacy. This implies that nominations of candidates are unlikely to 
Doctoral Thesis by Zsuzsanna Szemerédi: Merit and Internal Politics in Public Organizations: The Case of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
 
 
82 
change strategically across election years in response to marginal changes in the 
composition of the evaluators’ pool. In contrast, in the public university 
examinations studied in the literature, evaluation committees can change drastically 
from one exam to another, either because they are randomly selected (Zinovyeva 
and Bagues 2015) or because they are selected by changing political figures, like 
education ministers (Combes et al. 2008). As a result, strategic nominations and 
candidacies are likely to arise in those contexts, unless the identity of evaluators is 
kept secret until the candidates are registered. 
Second, while in public university examinations a substantial portion of 
candidates is composed by junior or non-famous senior scholars, all candidates to 
the membership of the HAS are distinguished scholars in their fields and within 
their age cohort. This implies that the status of candidates in the scientific 
community, and hence their unobserved quality, are unlikely to increase 
systematically in the numbers of HAS members to whom they are connected.  
To test the above arguments empirically, I investigate below whether 
conditional on the characteristics used in (4.1) and (4.2) as controls, and on the 
scientific division and election cycle of reference, candidates’ observable quality at 
the time of their nomination is systematically correlated with the number of 
colleagues and coauthors of those candidates in the HAS scientific division for 
which they are being considered. Since observable and unobservable dimensions of 
quality should be correlated, if candidates’ nominations were orthogonal to the 
composition of their evaluators’ pool, and if there were no systematic relationship 
between a candidate’s connections with HAS members and his unobservable 
quality, then conditional on the controls, we should find observable quality to be 
uncorrelated with the evaluators’ pool composition. In order to conduct this test, I 
estimate the following equations: 
ܥ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾଵܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ܾଶܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ࢘ᇱࢆ௜௧ ൅ ߟ௜௧. (4.4) 
ܥ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾଵܥ݋ܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ܾଶܦ‐ܥ݋݈݈݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ݏ௜௧ ൅ ࢘ᇱࢆ௜௧ ൅ ߠ௜௧. (4.5) 
ࢆ௜௧ is the vector of controls used in regressions (4.1) and (4.2), ߟ௜௧ and ߠ௜௧ are 
normally distributed i.i.d. error terms with zero mean, and ܾଵ, ܾଶ and ࢘ are 
coefficients to be estimated. I estimate equations (4.4) and (4.5) above by OLS, 
with the standard errors clustered at the candidate’s scientific division level to 
control for division-specific shocks and for potential heteroskedasticity. The results 
are presented in Table 4.3.   
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Table 4.3. OLS estimates for the correlation between candidates’ observable quality and 
connections, conditional on the control variables 
Dependent variable = Citations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Connections in Committee   
    
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)    
 
D-Colleagues    
 
 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.02) 
 
Coauthors 
 
0.06** 
 
0.07** 
 
0.04 
 
0.06* 
 
0.08** 
 
0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
-0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
Field-Endorsers 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) 
 
Times-Candidate 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.009 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.008 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
Age 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
Constant 0.20 0.23 1.00 0.26 0.31** 1.08 
 (0.41) (0.45) (0.56) (0.41) (0.44) (0.57) 
F-Statistic 2.45** 1.33 4.14*** 2.43** 1.33 4.14*** 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.009 0.09 0.01 0.008 0.09 
Number of observations = 476. Standard errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
confidence level; ** significant at 5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4.3 estimate equations (4.4) and (4.5) without 
controlling for cycle and division fixed effects. The remaining columns introduce 
various combinations of such fixed effects as controls. A first, striking result is that 
objective quality, measured by cumulative citations, seems to be distributed across 
candidates independently of whether these have colleagues in the relevant HAS 
division: the estimated coefficients of Colleagues and D-Colleagues are nearly zero 
and statistically insignificant in all specifications.  
On the other hand, there seems to be a mild positive correlation between 
candidates’ objective quality and their number of coauthors in the HAS. When 
cycle fixed effects are not controlled for, a candidate whose number of coauthors in 
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the relevant HAS division is one standard deviation higher than another candidate’s, 
has 0.11 more normalized citations, corresponding to 10% of a standard deviation. 
While statistically significant, this correlation is rather small in size. Once election 
cycle fixed effects are included in the regression, the correlation falls drastically: a 
candidate who has a one standard deviation advantage over another in terms of 
HAS coauthors has a citations advantage of only 5% of a standard deviation. 
Moreover, the correlation is no longer statistically significant at conventional 
confidence levels.26  
While the above results cannot fully rule out that certain connections—
namely, coauthorship with HAS members—are somewhat correlated with 
candidates’ unobserved quality, and hence with the error terms in equations (4.1) 
and (4.2), they suggest that such correlation is unlikely to be large and that, 
consequently, my estimations of the coefficients in (4.1) and (4.2) should not be 
driven by endogeneity. Bearing this in mind, I now turn to the main object of my 
empirical analysis—that is, how candidates’ observable quality signals and 
connections affect their chances of being elected as HAS members. 
4.5. Empirical results 
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the determinants of candidates’ election resulting 
from the estimation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) by OLS. Tables A1, A2 and A3 in 
the appendix to this chapter present the results from estimating (4.1) and (4.2) as 
Probit models—namely, the marginal effects of changes in the independent 
variables on a candidate’s election probability, conditional on all the independent 
variables taking their sample mean values.  
In discussing the results, I will primarily refer to the OLS estimates. The 
Probit coefficients are entirely consistent, both in sign and in magnitude, with the 
OLS ones. Like before, in both the OLS and Probit regressions, I cluster the 
standard errors at the scientific division level. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, candidates who are more cited relative to the 
norm in their discipline are more likely to be elected as HAS members. Depending 
on whether and which fixed effects are included, and irrespective of whether 
equation (4.1) or (4.2) is estimated, a one standard deviation increase in citations, or 
                                                 
26 Identical results, available upon request, are obtained if controls for candidate characteristics are 
omitted from the regressions. 
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a one standard deviation increase in the h-index, increases a candidate’s probability 
of being elected by two to three percentage points, which corresponds to a ten to 
fifteen per cent variation over the sample mean. The effect of citations on the 
election probability does not seem to be especially driven by extremely good or 
poor citation records. As shown by Table 4.5, belonging to the group of the 10% 
most cited raises a candidate’s chances to be elected by 2-3 percentage points, while 
belonging to the group of the 10% least cited reduces a candidate’s chances by 6-7 
percentage points. None of these effects is statistically significant at the 
conventional confidence levels. 
Table 4.4. OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ observable quality (citations) and 
connections with recruiters on their probability to be elected as HAS 
members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables   
    
 
Citations 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003* 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.006** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
Coauthors  -0.007 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Field-Endorsers  0.03 
 
0.04** 
 
0.03* 
 
0.04* 
 
0.03* 
 
0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Times-Candidate  0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
       
Constant 0.40** 0.25* 0.19 0.40** 0.30** 0.22* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
F-Statistic 9.37*** 6.11*** 5.43*** 9.38*** 6.20*** 5.51*** 
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.14 
Number of observations = 476. Standard errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
confidence level; ** significant at 5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level.  
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Table 4.5. OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ extreme observable quality 
(citations) and connections with recruiters on their probability to be elected 
as HAS members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables   
    
 
High-Citations 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
       
Low-Citations -0.07 (0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
       
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
Coauthors 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Field-Endorsers  0.03 
 
0.03** 
 
0.03* 
 
0.02 
 
0.03* 
 
0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Times-Candidate  0.04** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05** 
 
0.04** 
 
0.05** 
 
0.05** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
       
Constant 0.38** 0.23* 0.18 0.39** 0.28** 0.22* 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
F-Statistic 8.07*** 5.61*** 5.01*** 8.09*** 5.67*** 5.08*** 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.13 
Number of observations = 476. Standard errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
confidence level; ** significant at 5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
Also, consistent with Hypothesis 2, having more colleagues in the relevant 
HAS division increases a candidate’s probability of being elected. In particular, a 
one standard deviation increase in the number of institution colleagues raises the 
election probability by 5 percentage points when fixed effects are included, 
corresponding to a 26% variation over the mean election probability. A one 
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standard deviation increase in the number of department colleagues sitting in the 
HAS raises a candidate’s election probability by 4 percentage points, corresponding 
to a 21% variation over the sample mean. 
Table 4.6. OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ observable quality (h-index) and 
connections with recruiters on their probability to be elected as HAS 
members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables   
    
 
H-Index 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003* 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
Coauthors 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Field-Endorsers  0.03 
 
0.04** 
 
0.03* 
 
0.02 
 
0.03* 
 
0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Times-Candidate  0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age  -0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
       
Constant 0.40** 0.25 0.18 0.40** 0.30** 0.22 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
F-Statistic 9.28*** 6.05*** 5.40*** 9.28*** 6.12*** 5.46*** 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.13 
Number of observations = 476. Standard errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% 
confidence level; ** significant at 5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
Interestingly, having colleagues in the HAS affects a candidate’s chances of 
election substantially more than being a highly cited scholar, both economically and 
statistically—none of the citation coefficients is significant at the conventional 
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confidence thresholds, whereas the colleague coefficients are mostly significant, 
either at the 1% or 5% confidence levels. 
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, having more coauthors in the HAS does not help 
a candidate to be elected—if anything, it reduces his chances. In most 
specifications, and irrespective of whether citations are measured through the 
citation count, the h-index or the extreme citation percentile dummies, a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of a candidate’s HAS coauthors in the 
relevant division reduces his probability of being elected by almost 2 percentage 
points, corresponding to a 10% variation over the sample mean. However, this 
effect is generally not statistically significant. 
The above results on the differential effect of having colleagues or coauthors 
in the HAS on the candidates’ election probability are consistent with Hypothesis 3, 
and strikingly inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. The difference between the effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in a candidate’s HAS colleagues and the effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in his coauthors on the election probability is 
about 7 percentage points when institution colleagues are considered, and 6 
percentage points when department colleagues are considered, corresponding to 
36% and 31% of the mean election probability, respectively.  
These results are consistent with evaluators’ opportunism playing a significant 
role in the election process. In other words, the empirical findings suggest that when 
voting on candidates, HAS members do not value what seems from a theoretical 
viewpoint the most informative source of soft information on their quality—
namely, the existence of a coauthorship relation. Instead, HAS members seem to 
give substantial weight to a candidate being their colleague. As discussed before, 
while the relationship with a colleague is less informative on scientific quality than 
that with a coauthor, electing a colleague is more likely to generate direct or indirect 
private benefits for the recruiter. Moreover, it should be easier for a HAS member 
to assess a colleague’s ability to provide private benefits and favors in the future, as 
the HAS member will be typically well informed on his colleague’s status and role 
in the institution or department where they both work, and hence on the colleague’s 
ability to affect the institution’s policies to his benefit. 
More broadly, the empirical results are consistent with the view of public 
agencies in the rational choice literature, according to which the cost of delegating 
decision authority to an agency’s members is that they will use, at least in part, their 
discretion to pursue private goals, possibly at the expense of the agency’s interests. 
Symmetrically, the results cast some doubts on the idea that implicit incentive 
mechanisms such as intrinsic motivation and reputational concerns are strong 
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enough to eradicate opportunism and turn public agents into efficient Weberian 
bureaucrats. This conclusion seems especially appropriate in the case of the HAS, 
where the social status and prestige of agency members, and hence the power of 
implicit incentives, should be at its highest.  
Besides being theoretically interesting, the above results may also have policy 
implications. If the HAS aims to design election rules and procedures that are 
consistent with its goal of boosting academic excellence, the fact that its members 
tend to elect their own colleagues more than the candidates with higher objective 
quality, or whose scientific depth they are better positioned to evaluate, suggests 
that it may be worthwhile experimenting with a reformed election rule that prevents 
HAS members from voting on their colleagues in the first place.  
The fact that having coauthors in the HAS not only does not increase, but 
even slightly reduces a candidate’s chances of being elected, is somewhat surprising 
from a theoretical viewpoint. A possible explanation suggested by some of the HAS 
members I have interviewed, but which cannot be tested econometrically on my 
dataset, is that long-term coauthorship often generates competition and conflicts, 
especially when the coauthors are distinguished scholars and hence are less likely to 
compromise on divisive issues. While this explanation may be plausible, more 
investigation is definitely needed to fully elucidate the puzzle. 
It is also instructive to briefly analyze the control variables. In all the 
specifications, being endorsed by a larger number of scholars increases a 
candidate’s chances of being elected, and more so if the endorsers belong to the 
same research field as the candidate. If we focus (for the sake of brevity) on Table 
4.4, a one standard deviation increase in the number of endorsers increases a 
candidate’s election chances by a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 9 percentage 
points, depending on which fixed effects are controlled for. Moreover, holding the 
total number of endorsers constant, a one standard deviation increase in the number 
of endorsers from the candidate’s same field increases his election chances by 4 to 5 
percentage points. These results make sense: if a candidate has many endorsers that 
may indicate a strong consensus on his scholarly merits. Alternatively, a large 
number of endorsers may reflect the candidate’s power and (possibly political) 
influence in his academic reference group, which may be valued, or feared, by his 
evaluators. 
Having been an unsuccessful candidate in the past also significantly raises the 
probability of being elected in any given year: a one standard deviation increase in 
past nominations raises a candidate’s chances of success by 5 percentage points. 
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Again, the persistence of nominators in proposing a candidate may reflect his high 
scientific quality, his political influence, or a mixture of the two.  
The data also indicate that older candidates have a much lower probability of 
being elected as HAS members, compared to younger ones. A one standard 
deviation increase in a candidate’s age reduces his chances of success by 6 to 7 
percentage points, corresponding to 31% to 36% variations over the mean 
probability. The HAS members I have interviewed agree in that elderly scholars are 
less willing or less capable to invest time and effort in the more time-consuming 
activities performed by the organization, and this leads the HAS members to often 
prefer younger candidates, even at the cost of sacrificing the extra prestige that a 
more senior scholar may bring to the Academy. This argument is fully confirmed by 
the empirical results discussed above. 
A final, general remark suggested by the above empirical results is that 
characteristics of candidates other than their objective quality play an 
overwhelmingly important role in determining their chances of being elected as 
HAS members. First, as we have seen, the objective quality measure per excellence 
in academia and science—citations—has a modest, albeit positive effect on the 
elections, compared to the less objective candidate characteristics that may be 
detected by connected evaluators or signaled by endorsers. Second, while the 
econometric models estimated here have predictive power (the F-statistic is highly 
significant across specifications), they leave a large portion of the variation in 
candidates’ election probability unexplained (the highest R2 among all 
specifications is 0.14).  
These findings suggest that numerous factors other than the candidates’ 
objective quality, or other easily measurable characteristics such as age, importantly 
affect their chances of success. Since the primary goal of the HAS, as specified in 
its bylaws and mission statement, is to select top scholars and scientists in a country 
that is not short of them, and given that academic institutions around the world 
emphasize objective citation and publication metrics as the proper way to measure 
scientific quality, these results are puzzling.  
One possible explanation for the observed patterns is that the evaluators’ 
opportunism and private networking dominate the election process, relegating the 
assessment of candidates’ quality to a marginal role. If this is the case, 
improvements may be obtained by modifying the HAS election rules and its internal 
control systems to control and des-incentivize opportunism. Another possible 
explanation is that citations and other standardized bibliometric indicators are not 
appropriate measures of candidate quality in all scientific fields, and therefore they 
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are rightly disregarded by some of the HAS evaluators. In the next chapter, I will 
attempt to shed some light on this second explanation by separately examining the 
determinants of the HAS elections within each scientific division.  
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Appendix to Chapter 4: Probit Estimates 
Table 4.A.1. Probit estimates for the effect of candidates’ observable quality (citations) 
and connections with recruiters on their probability to be elected as HAS 
members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables   
    
 
Citations 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03* 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003** 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
       
 
Coauthors 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01** 
 
-0.01* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.30*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
Field-Endorsers 
 
0.03* 
 
0.04** 
 
0.04** 
 
0.02 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Age 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
χ2 58.44*** 80.20*** 86.18*** 58.39*** 80.44*** 86.11*** 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Number of observations = 476. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the independent variables. Standard 
errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 5% 
confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
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Table 4.A.2. Probit estimates for the effect of candidates’ extreme observable quality 
(citations in top and bottom 10%) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as HAS members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables       
 
High-Citations 
 
0.008 
 
0.008 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
       
Low-Citations -0.12 (0.10) 
-0.15* 
(0.09) 
-0.19** 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
-0.19** 
(0.09) 
       
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003* 
 
0.009*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.006 
(0.004) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
       
 
Coauthors 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.01** 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.01** 
 
-0.01** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Field-Endorsers 
 
0.03* 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.03** 
 
0.02 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05** 
 
0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Age 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
χ2 58.97*** 81.61*** 88.47*** 59.16*** 81.63*** 88.08*** 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Number of observations = 476. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the independent variables. Standard 
errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 5% 
confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level.  
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Table 4.A.3. Probit estimates for the effect of candidates’ observable quality (h-index) 
and connections with recruiters on their probability to be elected as HAS 
members 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Explanatory variables       
 
H-Index 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03** 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
Colleagues 
 
0.003** 
 
0.009*** 
 
0.009** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    
       
D-Colleagues    
 
0.005 
(0.004) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
       
 
Coauthors 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.01** 
 
-0.01* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Control variables       
 
Endorsers  
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.05*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Field-Endorsers 
 
0.03* 
 
0.04*** 
 
0.03** 
 
0.02 
 
0.03*** 
 
0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.05*** 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Age 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 
-0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Division fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y 
       
Cycle fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
       
χ2 58.25*** 79.86*** 86.35*** 58.21*** 80.01*** 86.15*** 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Number of observations = 476. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the independent variables. Standard 
errors, clustered by scientific division, in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 5% 
confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
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5.1. Defining division-specific measures 
5.1.1. Why customize? 
In the previous chapter I have investigated the determinants of the HAS 
elections by treating each candidate in each year as an observation. A clear 
advantage of this approach is that it allows the empirical analysis to rest on a larger 
number of observations, and to include fixed effects that account for division-level 
and year-level idiosyncrasies in the election process. At the same time, the approach 
followed in Chapter 4 cannot shed light on what these idiosyncrasies are. Echoing 
this limitation, in some scientific divisions, interviewed HAS members and expert 
scholars have argued that because of important division-specific publication 
patterns and other specificities, customized measures for observed scientific quality 
and control variables may be introduced at the division level.  
5.1.2. Weighting citations by subfield and coauthors 
First of all, some HAS members argued that citation practices differ across 
subfields within the same scientific division, so a citation index normalized by 
subfield may better capture a candidate’s scientific achievement. Unfortunately, the 
HAS members also agreed that normalization may introduce a subjective element 
into the empirical analysis, and as such, they were unable to provide clear 
recommendations as to what normalization practices should be used. To 
nevertheless construct subfield-normalized, division-specific citation indexes, I 
have taken advantage of the fact that candidates to the HAS membership are 
required to hold a Doctor of the HAS degree. One of the requirements to apply for 
this degree is to have a minimum number of citations. All the scientific divisions in 
my study, except for Mathematics, Physics, and Economics and Law, provide 
separate definitions of the minimum mandatory number of citations for each of the 
division’s subfields. I interpret a large minimum citation requirement as an indicator 
that the subfield in question has a high-citation practice, and vice versa. 
Accordingly, I have constructed a weighted citation count, W-Citationsit, whereby 
the citations of candidate i in year t are divided by the minimum citation 
requirement in his subfield.27 
                                                 
27 For candidates with multiple subfields, the citation count was divided by the average minimum 
requirement across those subfields. 
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Members of the Physical Sciences HAS division also pointed out that it is not 
uncommon for journal articles in Physics to have extraordinarily high numbers of 
coauthors, sometimes in the order of multiple hundreds. This practice is primarily 
due to the fact that scientific research in Physics often involves labor-intensive 
laboratory work. To account for the fact that citations to papers with significantly 
different numbers of coauthors may not have the same value as signals of the 
authors’ scholarly excellence, the interviewed HAS members recommended to 
weigh citations to an article by the number of coauthors.  
Accordingly, I have created a fractionalized citation index for the Physics 
division, F-Citationsit, which is given by the number of cumulative citations of 
candidate i in year t, multiplied by the coauthorship weights used to assign the 
Doctor of the HAS degree in Physics. According to the Doctor of the HAS rules, 
citations to articles with 1-5 coauthors are weighted 100%. Citations to articles with 
6-10 coauthors are weighted 75%. Citations to articles with 11-20 coauthors are 
weighted 50%. Citations to articles with 21-100 coauthors are weighted 25%. 
Finally, citations to articles with over 100 coauthors are given zero weight. To 
illustrate, the fractionalized citations index computed according to these weights 
implies that for an article with 21 coauthors that has been cited 80 times, a 
candidate is attributed 80*0.25 = 20 citations instead of 80 citations.28  
5.1.3. Accounting for the differential value of journal articles as a 
quality indicator across divisions 
A member of the Chemical Sciences scientific division pointed out that in 
chemistry, in addition to journal articles, patents are also considered important 
indicators of scientific achievement. I have therefore constructed a patents indicator 
for the chemistry division, Patentsit, which is given by the citations to all the patents 
registered by candidate i up to year t. I consider citations to patents rather than the 
mere patent count, because highly cited patents are typically the more successful 
ones in terms of licensing, industrial use, and revenue creation. 
Members of the Engineering scientific division suggested that their members 
generally belong to three broad areas—civil, mechanical, and electrical 
engineering—and that citations may be less relevant as a measure of quality in civil 
engineering, given the greater importance of professional practice, relative to 
                                                 
28 More detailed information on these weights can be found at http://mta.hu/.  
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scientific scholarship, in that field. Accordingly, I have included in the engineering 
division’s regressions an indicator for whether the candidate is a civil engineer, and 
interaction terms between the civil engineering indicator and the candidate’s 
citation measures (namely, total citations, normalized citations, and the h-index).  
Finally, members of the Earth Sciences division pointed out that in their 
research fields, and particularly in geography, publications in international outlets 
are limited, and national or even regional books may be considered important 
indicators of scientific achievement. Hence, I have included in the Earth Sciences 
division’s regressions an augmented citation measure that also includes those 
books. Since national and regional books are not indexed by the WOS, this 
augmented measure has been constructed using the Academy Database described in 
section 4.3. 
5.2. Empirical results 
I now turn to investigate whether within each of the 8 scientific divisions included 
in my database, the customized quality measures suggested by HAS members and 
described above perform better than the one-size-fits-all measures used in Chapter 4 
to estimate the determinants of election outcomes.  
First, I present for each division a table that compares the predictive power of 
the one-size-fits-all measures with that of the customized measures. For the 
divisions where no customized measures have been suggested, I simply present the 
regression with the one-size-fits-all measures estimated at the division level. This 
allows one to assess to what extent the econometric model used in Chapter 4 for all 
the divisions together is a good predictor of election outcomes in division in 
question.  
After presenting the division-specific econometric results, I compare them to 
the pooled results from Chapter 4, and I draw some general conclusions. 
5.2.1. Mathematics division 
In Mathematics, the only customization that was suggested by the interviewed 
HAS members was to normalize citations by subfields. However, the minimum 
citation requirements are not disaggregated at the subfield level in the Mathematics 
division. Since I had no objective and consistent basis to construct a subfield-
normalized citation index, I simply report in Table 5.1 the results of regressing 
candidates’ election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all measures used in Chapter 
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4, as an assessment of how accurately my general econometric model predicts the 
Mathematics division’s outcomes. 
Table 5.1. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Mathematics division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) 
   
Explanatory variables   
   
Citations 
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Colleagues 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.01 
(0.01) 
Coauthors 
 
0.01 
(0.03) 
 
0.01 
(0.03) 
   
Control variables   
   
Endorsers  
 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.04 
(0.04) 
 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Age 
 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
   
Constant 
 
-0.13 
(0.43) 
 
-0.13 
(0.43) 
   
F-Statistic 3.54*** 3.54*** 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.21 
Number of observations = 58. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
The results suggest that neither cumulative citations, nor having colleagues or 
coauthors among the evaluators, significantly affect a candidate’s chances to be 
elected as a member of the HAS Mathematics division.  
The only variable from the general econometric model that seems to have a 
substantial impact on elections in the Mathematics division is the candidates’ 
number of endorsers: a one standard deviation increase in this variable raises the 
chances of election by 16 percentage points, nearly 100% of the mean election 
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probability. This may indicate that in Mathematics, endorsers coordinate quite well 
on the preferred candidates, so that the number of endorsements is a good predictor 
of the election’s outcome. Consistent with that, the number of endorsers has a much 
higher variance and range of variation (given by the difference between the 
maximum and the minimum) in the Mathematics division than in all the other HAS 
divisions, suggesting that endorsers are quite careful in differentiating among 
candidates. Of course, one cannot tell from this finding whether the endorsers in 
Mathematics coordinate on candidates of higher unobservable quality, or simply, 
well organized groups of endorsers collude on their preferred candidates. However, 
the high prestige and awards records exhibited by members of the HAS 
Mathematics division, suggests that coordination on quality may be a more 
plausible explanation for the observed effect of endorsements on election outcomes.  
5.2.2. Physics division 
Like in Mathematics, no subfield-normalized citations index is available in 
Physics. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.2 report the results of regressing 
candidates’ election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In 
columns (3) and (4), the number of citations is replaced by the fractionalized 
citation index weighted by the number of coauthors, which was recommended by 
the interviewed HAS members as a more appropriate measure of the value of 
citations in Physics. 
The results suggest that in the Physics division, not only citations and 
connections are not significantly correlated with the election outcomes, but more 
generally, none of the variables from the general model used in Chapter 4 has 
predictive power. Moreover, and despite the interviewees’ conjecture, the 
correlation between candidates’ citations and their election probability does not 
significantly increase after correcting for the number of coauthors. 
5.2.3. Engineering division 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.3 report the results of regressing candidates’ 
election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In columns (3) 
and (4), the number of citations is replaced by the citation index normalized by 
subfields. In addition, the indicator variable for civil engineer candidates, and its 
interaction with the citation index, are both included as additional explanatory 
variables. 
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Table 5.2. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Physics division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
-0.002 
(0.07) 
 
0.02 
(0.07) 
  
 
F-Citations 
   
0.01 
(0.07) 
 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Colleagues 
 
0.001 
(0.02) 
  
0.000 
(0.02) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.03 
(0.02) 
  
0.03 
(0.02) 
Coauthors 
 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.08 
(0.05) 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
 
0.08 
(0.06) 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.01 
(0.07) 
 
0.002 
(0.07) 
 
0.02 
(0.07) 
 
0.002 
(0.07) 
Age 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
     
Constant 
 
0.54 
(0.60) 
 
0.44 
(0.57) 
 
0.56 
(0.60) 
 
0.41 
(0.57) 
     
F-Statistic 0.64 0.96 0.65 0.96 
Adjusted R2 -0.05 -0.006 -0.05 -0.005 
Number of observations = 44. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
The results suggest that consistent with the general econometric model from 
Chapter 4, in the Engineering division candidates who have many colleagues among 
their evaluators stand greater chances to be elected as HAS members. A one 
standard deviation increase in the number of workplace colleagues sitting in the 
HAS engineering division raises a candidate’s chances by 7 percentage points, or 
57% of the mean election probability. In contrast with the results from the general 
model, there is no significant correlation in the engineering division between the 
number of a candidate’s department colleagues and his probability of being elected.  
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Table 5.3. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Engineering division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
  
 
N-Citations 
   
0.04 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Colleagues 
 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
  
0.005* 
(0.03) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.007 
(0.01) 
  
0.005 
(0.01) 
Coauthors 
 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
 
0.07 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Age 
 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Civil Engineer 
   
0.28 
(0.28) 
 
0.34 
(0.29) 
Civil Engineer*Citations 
   
0.36 
(0.50) 
 
0.44 
(0.51) 
     
Constant 
 
0.18 
(0.42) 
 
0.26 
(0.43) 
 
0.16 
(0.42) 
 
0.23 
(0.43) 
     
F-Statistic 2.82** 2.15* 2.28** 1.89* 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.08 
Number of observations = 79. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
Once again consistently with the general model, neither citations nor having 
coauthors among the evaluators seem correlated with the election outcomes in the 
engineering division.  
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Finally, and in contrast with what suggested by the interviewed HAS 
members, the effect of citations does not increase when these are normalized by 
citation patterns in different subfields, and it does not decrease for candidates in the 
civil engineering subfield. 
5.2.4. Chemistry division 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.4 report the results of regressing candidates’ 
election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In columns (3) 
and (4), the number of citations is replaced by the citation index normalized by 
subfields. In addition, the index of patent citations is included as an additional 
explanatory variable. 
The results suggest that, consistent with the divisions analyzed so far and with 
the results in the general model, citations and coauthorship with the evaluators do 
not increase a candidate’s election chances in the Chemistry division, whereas 
having colleagues among the evaluators, and above all, having many endorsers and 
having been a candidate in the past, all positively affect the probability of election. 
To illustrate, a one standard deviation increase in the number of a candidate’s 
workplace colleagues sitting in the HAS raises his chances by 11 percentage points, 
or 46% of the mean election probability. A one standard deviation increase in the 
number of endorsers and in the past candidacies raises the election chances by 13 
percentage points (51% of the mean) and 15 percentage points (58% of the mean), 
respectively.  
As in the other divisions, the customizations suggested by the HAS members 
do not seem to improve our ability to predict the election outcomes in Chemistry. In 
particular, neither normalizing the citations by subfields nor including patents in the 
citation count significantly increase the correlation between a candidate’s observed 
scientific quality and his/her probability of being elected as a member of the 
Chemistry division. One possible reason for the low explanatory power of patents in 
the Chemistry division is that I did not have access to patents’ revenues, which may 
be a more accurate indicator of the patents’ impact than their citations. 
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Table 5.4. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Chemistry division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
-0.007 
(0.06) 
 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
  
 
N-Citations 
   
0.04 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
P-Citations 
    
-0.001 
(0.06) 
Colleagues 
 
0.02 
(0.01) 
  
0.03* 
(0.01) 
 
0.02 
(0.01) 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.02 
(0.01) 
  
 
 
Coauthors 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
0.009 
(0.02) 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.17*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
Age 
 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
     
Constant 
 
-0.31 
(0.63) 
 
-0.44 
(0.63) 
 
-0.31 
(0.62) 
 
-0.31 
(0.63) 
     
F-Statistic 2.80** 2.54** 2.80** 2.80** 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.18 
Number of observations = 48. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
5.2.5. Biology division 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.5 report the results of regressing candidates’ 
election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In columns (3) 
and (4), the number of citations is replaced by the citation index normalized by 
subfields. 
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Table 5.5. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Biology division 
Dependent variable = 
Election 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
0.15*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.16*** 
(0.03) 
  
 
N-Citations 
   
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
Colleagues 
 
0.02 
(0.01) 
  
0.01 
(0.01) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.03** 
(0.01) 
  
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Coauthors 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
 
0.06 
(0.04) 
 
0.07 
(0.04) 
Age 
 
-0.01** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.01** 
(0.006) 
     
Constant 
 
0.79** 
(0.38) 
 
0.67* 
(0.37) 
 
0.79** 
(0.38) 
 
0.68* 
(0.37) 
     
F-Statistic 6.12*** 7.30*** 5.70*** 6.65*** 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.30 
Number of observations = 78. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
Compared to the other HAS divisions analyzed so far, the Biology division is 
noteworthy under two respects. First, it is the only one where a candidate’s citation 
record significantly enhances his chances of being elected as a HAS member. A one 
standard deviation increase in cumulative citations increases the election probability 
by 16 percentage points, nearly a 100% increase over the mean. The effect remains 
strong, though slightly smaller in scale, if the citation count is normalized to 
account for different citation patterns across subfields. In fact, a comparison of the 
correlation between citations and the election outcomes in Biology and in the other 
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divisions suggests that the mild positive correlation estimated for the general model 
is essentially driven by the Biology division, which is one of the ones with the 
highest number of candidates across the four election cycles in my database.  
The second noteworthy feature of the Biology division is that it is the one 
where the general econometric model from Chapter 4 has by far the greatest 
predictive power. In particular, in addition to citations, a candidate’s election 
probability is significantly increased by the number of his department colleagues 
sitting in the HAS and by the number of times he has been a candidate in the past, 
whereas it is decreased by the candidate’s age. Overall, the general model explains 
about 30% of the variation in election outcomes in the Biology division. 
5.2.6. Medicine division 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.6 report the results of regressing candidates’ 
election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In columns (3) 
and (4), the number of citations is replaced by the citation index normalized by 
subfields. 
As in the case of the Physics division, the standard model appears to have no 
predictive power in the Medicine division, as the election chances of candidates are 
uncorrelated with their citations (absolute or normalized by subfield), with their 
connections with the evaluators (number of colleagues and coauthors), and with the 
control variables (number of endorsers, age, and number of past candidacies). 
5.2.7. Earth Sciences division 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.7 report the results of regressing candidates’ 
election probabilities on the one-size-fits-all explanatory variables. In columns (3) 
and (4), the number of citations is replaced by a citation index that includes 
citations to books and is normalized by subfields. 
In the Earth Sciences division, consistently with the general model, a 
candidate’s number of endorsers positively affects his election chances, whereas his 
age decreases those chances. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the 
number of endorsers increases the probability of election by 18 percentage points, 
or 90% of the mean, whereas a one standard deviation increase in a candidate’s age 
decreases his election chances by 8 percentage points, or 41% of the mean. 
On the other hand, the general model’s main explanatory variables—citations 
and connections—do not seem to have much predictive power in the Earth Sciences 
division. If anything, having more colleagues among the evaluators decreases a 
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candidate’s election probability, rather than increasing it. For instance, a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of HAS department colleagues reduces 
the election probability by 12 percentage points, or 64% of the mean. 
Table 5.6. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Medicine division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
  
 
N-Citations 
   
-0.007 
(0.04) 
 
-0.005 
(0.04) 
Colleagues 
 
0.008 
(0.009) 
  
0.008 
(0.009) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.05 
(0.06) 
  
0.05 
(0.06) 
Coauthors 
 
0.000 
(0.02) 
 
0.002 
(0.02) 
 
0.005 
(0.02) 
 
0.005 
(0.02) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Times-Candidate 
 
-0.008 
(0.05) 
 
-0.003 
(0.05) 
 
-0.005 
(0.05) 
 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
Age 
 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
     
Constant 
 
0.49 
(0.51) 
 
0.52 
(0.51) 
 
0.51 
(0.51) 
 
0.52 
(0.51) 
     
F-Statistic 0.96 0.92 0.85 0.86 
Adjusted R2 -0.003 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 
Number of observations = 69. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
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Table 5.7. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Earth Sciences division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Explanatory variables     
     
Citations 
 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
  
 
N-Citations 
   
-0.03 
(0.06) 
 
0.03 
(0.06) 
Colleagues 
 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
  
-0.10 
(0.06) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
  
-0.12 
(0.06) 
Coauthors 
 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
     
Control variables     
     
Endorsers  
 
0.21** 
(0.09) 
 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.10 
(0.07) 
 
0.11 
(0.07) 
 
0.10 
(0.07) 
 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Age 
 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01* 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
 
-0.01* 
(0.008) 
     
Constant 
 
0.30 
(0.59) 
 
0.41 
(0.58) 
 
0.30 
(0.58) 
 
0.41 
(0.58) 
     
F-Statistic 2.45** 2.80** 2.47** 2.81** 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.20 
Number of observations = 43. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
5.2.8. Economics and Law division 
For this division no customizations of the standard model were implemented 
resulting from the difficulty to find a customization that would suit highly different 
fields of study (including sociology, law, and political science). Nevertheless, as for 
Mathematics, I report in Table 5.8 the results of regressing candidates’ election 
probabilities on the one-size-fits-all measures used in estimating the general model, 
as an assessment of how accurately these variables predict the Economics and Law 
division’s outcomes. 
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As in Physics and Medicine, the standard model seems to have no predictive 
power in the Economics and Law division: the election chances of candidates are 
uncorrelated with their citations, with their connections with the evaluators (number 
of colleagues and coauthors), and with the control variables (number of endorsers, 
age, and number of past candidacies). 
Table 5.8. Division-specific analysis—OLS estimates for the effect of candidates’ 
observable quality (citations) and connections with recruiters on their 
probability to be elected as members of the HAS Economics and Law division 
Dependent variable = Election (1) (2) 
   
Explanatory variables   
   
Citations 
 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Colleagues 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
D-Colleagues 
  
0.000 
(0.02) 
Coauthors 
 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
   
Control variables   
   
Endorsers  
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
Times-Candidate 
 
0.04 
(0.06) 
 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Age 
 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
   
Constant 
 
0.26 
(0.58) 
 
0.28 
(0.58) 
   
F-Statistic 0.48 0.48 
Adjusted R2 -0.05 -0.05 
Number of observations = 57. Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% confidence level; ** significant at 
5% confidence level; * significant at 10% confidence level. 
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5.3. Patterns in the Division-Level Regressions 
Overall, the division-level regressions presented in this chapter reveal a number of 
patterns, which I discuss in some more detail below.  
5.3.1. The weak effect of candidates’ citations on the election outcomes 
First, the cumulative WOS citations of candidates have a positive and 
significant effect on their probability to be elected as HAS members only in one 
scientific division out of eight—namely, the Biology division. This is consistent 
with the overall weak effect of citations on the election outcomes observed in 
Chapter 4. However, the division-level regressions also suggest that the mild 
positive correlation between citations and election probabilities observed in Chapter 
4 may be driven by the isolated strong effect of citations in the Biology division. 
This seems more decidedly inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 as derived from the 
theoretical model, and it calls for further investigation to uncover the empirical 
puzzle. 
One potential explanation is that the various HAS divisions differ in terms of 
their scientific quality, and also in terms of their leadership’s willingness to boost 
quality and/or their trust in bibliometric quality indicators. If that were the case, it 
could be that in divisions with very high scientific quality and prestige, such as 
Mathematics, candidates are homogeneously good, so that marginal differences in 
citations do not reflect quality differences, and hence do not affect their chances to 
be elected. In less prestigious divisions one would expect more variance in 
candidates’ quality, and hence potentially a positive effect of citations on election 
probabilities. However, it is possible that in lower-quality divisions whose leaders 
are not interested in, or even opposed to, raising the division’s scientific profile, 
selected candidates would not be those with the best qualifications, but rather those 
who have better relationships with the sitting members. 
Clearly, none of the above hypotheses can be tested using the database 
employed here, so further data need to be collected, and additional research 
conducted, to explore their explanatory power. This is an exciting agenda that I aim 
to pursue in future empirical work. 
5.3.2. The role of connections 
Having colleagues among the evaluators has a positive effect on candidates’ 
election chances in all but one scientific division, and the effect is economically and 
statistically significant in 3 of those divisions. This result is consistent with the 
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general result from Chapter 4. If one interprets increases in the number of a 
candidate’s colleagues among the HAS members as an increase in both the 
candidate’s ability to privately benefit his evaluators and in the evaluators’ ability to 
assess the candidate’s qualifications, the observed pattern is also consistent with 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 from the theoretical model.  
At the same time, the division-specific regressions reveal that having 
coauthors among the evaluators is negatively correlated with candidates’ election 
chances in 5 out 8 divisions, and that the correlation is nowhere significant. If one 
interprets an increase in a candidate’s coauthors among the HAS members as an 
increase in the evaluators’ ability to assess his qualification, this result is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. As discussed before, this inconsistency is puzzling 
and should be further investigated. On the other hand, the fact that a significant and 
positive difference between the effect of having colleagues and coauthors among 
the evaluators on the election probabilities is observed in most divisions is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4, and inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, confirming that 
the evaluators’ opportunistic pursuit of private benefits does play a role in their 
recruitment choices. 
5.3.3. Division-specific idiosyncrasies 
The observed cross-divisional differences in the effects of certain variables on 
the election outcomes—for instance, the stronger effect of citations in Biology, or 
the stronger effect of candidates’ endorsements in Mathematics—suggest that the 
elections are affected by division-specific idiosyncrasies. This is consistent with the 
significance of the divisional fixed effects in the general regressions from Chapter 
4.  
However, another message that emerges from analyzing the division-specific 
regressions, is that these idiosyncrasies are not easy to measure. In particular, it is 
striking that none of the division-specific, customized measures of scientific quality 
suggested by the interviewed HAS members improves the explanatory power of the 
general econometric model, despite the interviewees’ presumably in-depth 
knowledge of their divisions. This suggests that division-specific idiosyncrasies 
should be further investigated, as a better understanding of what lies beneath them 
would provide valuable information on how to tailor the HAS electoral rules to 
divisional specificities and thus make the organization’s overall governance more 
efficient. 
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IN this dissertation, I have investigated the functioning of recruitment processes in 
public organizations, with particular emphasis on the interplay between recruiters’ 
loyalty to the organizational mission and their temptation to opportunistically select 
their own preferred candidates. To tackle this topic, I have developed a simple 
formal model of recruitment in public agencies and I have tested its predictions on a 
database of membership renewal elections to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, a 
public and independent organization that coordinates and finances most of 
Hungary’s scientific research activity, and plays an important role in crediting the 
scientific quality of prospective university professors. The organizational structure 
of the Academy—similarly to, but more so than, many other public organizations—
delegates considerable decision authority to recruiters and grants them a civil-
servant-like status characterized by tenured employment and low-powered explicit 
incentives. Thus, the Academy can be seen as a useful paradigm to explore the 
functioning of recruitment in public agencies more generally. 
My theoretical model predicts that both positive observable signals of 
scientific quality and connections with recruiters should facilitate a candidate’s 
election, and that among connected candidates, opportunistic recruiters will favor 
those who can procure them private benefits. Consistent with these predictions, I 
have shown that members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences are more likely to 
elect highly cited candidates and candidates who are their colleagues outside the 
Academy, and that among candidates connected to sitting Academy members, those 
who are their colleagues outside the Academy—and thus can more easily return 
favors via their influence on the common parent organization—stand a significantly 
greater chance to be elected than those who are the academicians’ coauthors. This 
finding seems consistent with connections being more a means for recruiters to 
extract private benefits than a means to evaluate unobservable dimensions of 
candidates’ quality. While my empirical setting and strategy is different, these 
results confirm recent evidence on the recruitment and accreditation of public 
universities’ professors (Combes et al. 2008; Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015).  
While pointing at the presence of opportunism in the behavior of public 
agencies’ recruiters, the empirical results presented in this dissertation also 
highlight a puzzle, and leave a few open questions, which should be further 
investigated in future research on this topic. First, the observed positive correlation 
between candidates’ citations and their chances to be elected as members of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences is mild, statistically insignificant, and apparently 
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driven by one single scientific division of the Academy—namely, Biology. One 
possible explanation for this puzzle, informally discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, 
is that citations are relevant for the election outcomes only in those divisions and 
fields where there is substantial variability in the quality of candidates—presumably 
those with a stronger reputation for scientific excellence. Another, possibly 
complementary explanation is that, irrespective of their true value as a measure of 
scientific quality, candidates’ citations and other bibliometric indexes count for 
election only in units where there is a sufficiently strong consensus among members 
on their validity and reliability as a measure. One way to test these potential 
explanation for the empirical puzzle uncovered here would be to construct measures 
for the HAS divisions’ reputation for research quality—for instance, by collecting 
recent data on their ability to obtain research grants from the European Union. One 
would expect that, if the informal explanation discussed in Chapter 5, and suggested 
by interviewed Academy members, is correct, citations should positively affect a 
candidate’s election chances only in divisions of sufficiently high quality. While 
this information was not available to the present study, collecting it in the future 
seems potentially feasible. 
Regarding the open research questions, it should be reiterated that this 
dissertation studies recruiters’ behavior—and the role of opportunism therein—
under a fixed organizational structure characterized by high delegation of authority 
and low-powered incentives. The main finding is that, consistent with much of the 
theoretical literature in both economics and public policy (e.g. Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1994; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Dessein 2002), some degree of 
opportunism is the price of delegation and low-powered incentives. While relevant, 
this empirical exercise and finding does not inform on whether the organizational 
structure of the organization under study is efficient or not (in a second best sense). 
Can recruiters’ opportunism be reduced without compromising recruitment quality 
and the Academy’s overall value added? And if yes, should opportunism be reduced 
by constraining the discretion of recruiters via ex ante procedural rules or by 
providing them with more explicit incentives? To address these important 
questions, it would be necessary to compare the behavior of recruiters in the 
Academy and in other public scientific organizations with similar mission but 
different organizational rules. Alternatively, one could compare the behavior of 
Academy members before and after changes in the organization’s governance 
structure. One potential strategy to perform a comparative study along these lines 
would be to focus on a different function of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences—
that of releasing a Doctor of the Academy degree that serves as an important step in 
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the accreditation of public universities’ professors. It is not uncommon that 
professors who work in one country but are citizens of another and hope to 
eventually return there, or who have appointments in two different countries, seek 
accreditation in both. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the organizational structure of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences differs from that of other organizations 
involved in academic accreditation across Europe, most notably in its degree of 
autonomy and isolation from ex post governmental scrutiny, but also in terms of the 
prestige and status of its members. Hence, observed differences in the accreditation 
chances of the same candidates in Hungary and elsewhere may be attributed to 
changes in the organizational rules that regulate recruiters’ behavior and incentives. 
Again, this seems a difficult, but by no means impossible, and potentially important 
empirical exercise that may be attempted in future research. 
Finally, this dissertation has deliberately focused on the voting behavior of the 
Academy’s members, abstracting from another important step in the organization’s 
election process—namely, the nomination of candidates. An important question 
there would be whether being nominated by certain, more influential Academy 
members, plays a major and special role in favoring their election. Another 
important question would be whether nominators behave strategically in order to 
favor their preferred candidates—for instance, by appropriately choosing the timing 
of nominations—and whether they manage, in the process, to communicate 
valuable information relevant for their colleagues’ voting decision, as emphasized 
by the cheap talk literature on the internal organization of firms (e.g., Crawford and 
Sobel 1982; Dessein 2002; Gibbons and Roberts 2013). These important research 
questions may be addressed in the future by collecting comprehensive data on 
candidates’ nominators and relating their characteristics to election outcomes. 
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